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ABSTRACT 
This thesis proposes an adoption of a data schema called RIMS (Requirements 
and Information Metadata System) developed as a pilot project in the Pittsburgh Field 
Office of the FBI and sets out to determine if RIMS could be an effective and efficient 
method to capture, catalogue and retrieve intelligence information within the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI). RIMS would enhance the search platform used by FBI 
analysts and investigators who gather or data mine existing information in furtherance of 
the FBI’s priorities. 
The use of this coding system can be adapted for use by other U.S. intelligence 
and law enforcement communities for commonality and uniformity in retrieval, 
cataloguing, and collecting of intelligence information. The use of this system can be 
manipulated into a non-classified code for use by state, local, and tribal law enforcement 
and intelligence entities. Finally, the use of the coding system within the intelligence 
community will consolidate and integrate information and intelligence and reduce delays 
in detecting and retrieving pertinent intelligence obtained and shared within the 
intelligence community. 
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Our job is to effectively integrate foreign, military and domestic intelligence 
in defense of the homeland and of United States interests abroad. 
 
—John D. Negroponte  
Director of National Intelligence 
 
On the most basic level, we need to take a step back and focus on the fundamental 
question: Why was the Department of Homeland Security created? It was not created 
merely to bring together different agencies under a single tent. It was created to 
enable these agencies to secure the homeland through joint, coordinated action. 
Our challenge is to realize that goal to the greatest extent possible. 
 
Let me tell you about three areas where I plan to focus our efforts to achieve that goal. 
First, we need to operate under a common picture of threats we are facing. Second, 
we need to respond actively to these threats with the appropriate policies. Third, 
we need to execute our various component operations in a unified manner so 
that when we access the intelligence and we have decided upon the proper policies, 
we can carry out our mission in a way that is coordinated across the board . 
 
— Secretary Chertoff, Statement for the Record Before the United States 
Senate Subcommittee on Homeland Security, 20 April 2005. 
 
A. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this thesis is to describe an intelligence and information tracking 
system that can support Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) activities and allow for the 
FBI’s integration and support to the United States Intelligence Community (USIC).  This 
system will allow a transition from the FBI’s existing information sharing and 
collaboration environment to an environment that will better support the FBI in meeting 
its goals and mission objectives. 
This thesis is intended not only to describe opportunities for better information 




but also to support subsequent work to realize the benefits. In short, this thesis should be 
used as a long-range guide to drive results in the FBI’s mission to successfully integrate 
and support the USIC. 
B. BACKGROUND 
The attacks of September 11, 2001, moved forward the longstanding call for 
major intelligence reform and the creation of a Director of National Intelligence (DNI). 1  
Post-9/11 investigations included a joint Congressional inquiry and the National 
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (better known as the 9/11 
Commission).  The report of the 9/11 Commission2 in July 2004 proposed sweeping 
change in the Intelligence Community. President George W. Bush signed four Executive 
Orders in August 2004 addressing structural and institutional changes. In Congress, both 
the House and Senate passed bills with major amendments to the National Security Act of 
1947. Intense negotiations to reconcile the bills ultimately led to the Intelligence Reform 
and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, which President Bush signed into law on 
December 17, 2004. 3  
Since the attacks of September 11, the overriding priority of the FBI has been 
protecting America by preventing future attacks. The FBI has refocused its priorities to 
better accomplish its mission and is making comprehensive changes in its overall 
structure, organization, and business practices.  Even as it evolves, the FBI continues to 
                                                 
1 The Director of National Intelligence (DNI) serves as the head of the Intelligence Community (IC). 
The DNI also acts as the principal advisor to the President, the National Security Council, and the 
Homeland Security Council for intelligence matters related to the national security; The DNI also oversees 
and directs the implementation of the National Intelligence Program. The President appoints the DNI with 
the advice and consent of the Senate. The Director is assisted by a Senate-confirmed Principal Deputy 
Director of National Intelligence (PDDNI), appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the 
Senate. Material and information pertaining to the Director of National Intelligence can be found at  
http://www.dni.gov/ (Accessed January 28, 2007). 
2 The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (also known as the 9-11 
Commission), an independent, bipartisan commission created by congressional legislation and the signature 
of President George W. Bush in late 2002, is chartered to prepare a full and complete account of the 
circumstances surrounding the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, including preparedness for, and the 
immediate response to, the attacks. The Commission is also mandated to provide recommendations 
designed to guard against future attacks. Full background on the 9/11 Commission can be found at 
http://www.9-11commission.gov/ (Accessed November 1, 2006). 
3 Full background on the IRTPA can be found at the Library of Congress site: 
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d108:s.02845 (Accessed January 28, 2007). 
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meet its traditional responsibilities to uphold and enforce federal criminal laws of the 
United States and to provide leadership and criminal justice services to federal, state, 
municipal, tribal, and international agencies and partners. The FBI remains committed to 
performing these responsibilities in a manner that is responsive to the needs of the public 
and is faithful to the Constitution and the laws of the United States.4 
The FBI’s top three priorities are: 1) protecting the United States from terrorist 
attack; 2) protecting the United States against foreign intelligence operations and 
espionage; and 3) protecting the United States against cyber-based attacks and high-
technology crimes. In addition to these missions, the FBI continues to combat public 
corruption at all levels, protect civil rights, and combat major white-collar crime and 
significant violent crime.5 
On June 28, 2005, the president directed the FBI to create a “National Security 
Service” within the FBI. The attorney general was to implement the White House 
Memorandum entitled “Strengthening the Ability of the Department of Justice to Meet 
Challenges to the Security of the Nation,” “subject to the availability of appropriations 
and in a manner consistent with applicable law, including the Constitution and laws 
protecting the freedom and information privacy of Americans.”6 This directive was 
implemented through the creation of a new organization — the National Security Branch 
(NSB) — that integrates the FBI’s primary national security programs under the 
leadership of a single FBI official, and through policies and initiatives designed to 
enhance the capability of the entire FBI to support the nation’s national security mission. 
The NSB consists of the Counterterrorism Division, the Counterintelligence 
Division, the Weapons of Mass Destruction Directorate, and the Directorate of 
Intelligence. The NSB promotes the development of a national security workforce with 
                                                 
4 FBI Public Website. http://www.fbi.gov/libref/historic/history/text.htm  (Accessed  November 3, 
2006). 
5 FBI Public Website. http://www.fbi.gov/quickfacts.htm  (Accessed November 3, 2006). 
6 The Memorandum for the Vice President, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, Attorney General, 
Secretary of Homeland Security, Director of OMB, Director of National Intelligence, Assistant to the 
President for National Security Affairs, and Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and 
Counterterrorism can be found at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/release/2005/06/print/20050629-1.html 
(Accessed November 12, 2006). 
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the skills, training, and experience necessary to carry out our national security 
investigative and intelligence programs. It also coordinates our national security efforts 
with the rest of the Intelligence Community under the leadership of the DNI.7 
Following the events of September 11, 2001, the FBI underwent a significant 
expansion of its mission responsibilities and a reordering of its priorities to emphasize its 
counterterrorist mission, though it still retains its important criminal investigation 
mission. The FBI recognized it would become ever more dependent on information 
technology in the future to manage the large quantities of information associated with 
these missions. It is challenging, for any organization engaged in a complex set of 
activities, to introduce new technologies and to reengineer its key processes to exploit 
them effectively. It is doubly challenging, as it is for the FBI, to do so when under intense 
operational pressures—the FBI’s traditional work must continue while new technology is 
introduced and while a culture more adapted to the use of IT evolves. And it is triply so 
for the FBI in the face of the added strain of its new focus—preventive 
counterterrorism—in which mission success demands a different mind-set, different 
operational skills, and the exploitation of an expanded set of information sources. 
With the recognition of the dependence upon information technology in the 
future, the FBI challenged itself to create an interoperable information-sharing 
environment within the FBI, which would enable the interchange of information among 
and between FBI entities.  This challenge enabled visionary leaders within the FBI to 
create an information-sharing environment that could be integrated among and between 
appropriate law enforcement and intelligence partners.  This innovative thinking led to 
the initial development of a ten to thirteen metadata code called Requirements and  
Information Metadata System (previously called “RICS” by one FBI field division).  The 
use of this coding system was a method to identify, catalogue, and retrieve intelligence 
information within the FBI. 
 
 
                                                 
7 FBI Public Website. http://www.fbi.gov/hq/nsb/nsb.htm  (Accessed March 8, 2007). 
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C. PROBLEM 
A disquieting trait of twentieth and twenty-first-century terrorist or surprise 
attacks is that the victims later discover they already possessed a substantial amount of 
information that might have prevented or mitigated the attack.  There have been 
intelligence successes and failures involving attacks by terrorists involving the United 
States (U.S.).  U.S. intelligence agencies already had information in their possession 
which, if properly assessed and disseminated, might have disrupted, deterred, or perhaps 
even prevented the attacks on September 11, 2001 (9/11) or the 1993 World Trade Center 
bombing.  
1. Connecting Clues and Intelligence 
In the summer of 2001, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) received 
information that al-Qaeda was plotting to use aircraft as flying bombs against symbolic 
American targets.8 The CIA passed the information to the FBI.  That same summer, the 
FBI office in Phoenix alerted FBI Headquarters that an “inordinate number of persons of 
investigative interest” were enrolled at flight schools in Arizona.9  The Minneapolis FBI 
office actually arrested one of these persons, Zacarias Moussaoui, and asked for 
permission to search Moussaoui’s laptop computer.  Permission was denied.  The 
Minneapolis Special Agent in Charge of the case persisted:  He was trying, he said, to 
make sure that Moussaoui “did not take control of a plane and fly it into the World Trade 
Center.”  He got back this answer from the New York field office:  “That’s not going to 
happen.  We don’t know he’s a terrorist.  You have a guy interested in this type of aircraft 
– and that’s it.”10 
Clues that connected one terrorist to another were frequently missed. At that time, 
no information technology system was in place to connect the clues and intelligence 
coming into the various field divisions or FBI Headquarters.  “Furthermore, New York 
                                                 
8 U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and U.S. House Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence, Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks on 
September 11, 2001, S. Rept No. 107-351, H. Rept. No. 107-792 (December 2002),  212. 
9 Ibid., 325. 
10 Ibid., 323-24. 
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prosecutors who investigated the 1990 killing of the extremist rabbi Meir Kahane insisted 
against the evidence that his murderer acted alone.  In 1993, they discovered that 
Kahane’s killer belonged to the same cell that tried to blow up the World Trade Center – 
but awareness of that earlier mistake did not prod investigators to follow the next round 
of clues linking the World Trade Center bombers to international terrorist organizations 
and foreign governments.”11  No one in the U.S. government had a tracking or tagging 
mechanism in place to catch anomalies, similarities, or to quickly share such analyzed 
information to prevent future attacks such as the events on September 11. 
2. Legal Issues: Tracking Threats Against America 
The CIA tracks foreign threats.  Should the terrorist enter the U.S., the CIA hands 
responsibility to the FBI, which is charged with defending Americans against domestic 
dangers.  The FBI was essentially a federal police force that goes to great lengths to 
respect the constitutional rights of the suspects it investigates.  That was why the FBI 
refused to authorize the search of Moussaoui’s computer.  He was not an American 
citizen under the protection of the American Constitution nor was he a criminal suspect.  
“He was believed to have been a combatant of a hostile army, an army whose sole 
purpose was to commit atrocities against American citizens.”12   
The strict rules imposed on the FBI in 1995 were intended to safeguard the 
division between criminal investigations and counterterrorism.  Counterterrorism agents 
believed they were forbidden to talk to people on the criminal side who might have 
knowledge about their case.  As Richard Clarke, the former chief of counterterrorism at 
the National Security Council told a joint congressional committee in 2002, the FBI 
“didn’t have the mission. It was not their job to be a domestic [intelligence] collection 
service.  Their job was to do law enforcement.  And they didn’t have the rules that 
permitted them to do domestic intelligence collection.”13   
                                                 
11 David Frum and Richard Perle, An End To Evil – How To Win the War on Terror (New York: 
Ballantine Books, 2003)  7: 165-167. 
12 Ibid., 168. 
13 Frum and Perle, An End To Evil – How To Win the War on Terror, 37. 
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3. FBI Lacked Central Search Platform  
The FBI also did not have the interoperable terrorism information-sharing 
environment needed to fully exploit the information collected across the U.S.  Stove-
piped investigative applications were prevalent and no central search platform existed to 
gather information or data mine the myriad of information gained daily from active FBI 
investigations and sources. 
The FBI needed to replace the established information technology (IT) enterprise 
framework, which stove-piped investigative applications with an improved approach to 
collect and manage FBI case and investigative information.  Additionally, the system 
must support the operational mission of the FBI by enhancing its information 
management capabilities. The collection, dissemination, and availability of data and 
investigative tasking across the entire organization will enable the assembly and 
management of case information for intelligence and investigative activities and will 
support rapid and effective information sharing among FBI personnel and with 
authorized external agencies. 
4. Current Information-Sharing Environment 
Currently, there is no central search platform to gather information or data mine 
within a genre of information.  Training on data mining and searching the various 
databases is minimal.  Some FBI field offices have taken formative steps to establish 
structured, relational databases to facilitate robust case management and intelligence 
support to operations.  These offices have elected to use a commercially available, off-
the-shelf software analytical application called iBase, which is produced by an IT 
industry software applications company called i2 INC.  In addition, several operational 
units at FBI Headquarters adopted similar approaches using structured, relational 
database packages.  Ultimately, the FBI must establish an enterprise-wide standardized 
approach for classifying investigative information into a structured, relational database 
environment to benefit fully from this technology.   
The well-publicized FBI Trilogy Information Technology Modernization Program 
(Trilogy) did not provide an effective return on the FBI’s IT investment (measured in 
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operational terms—more and better results, increased responsiveness and agility, and 
improved efficiency of operations).14  In February 2005, the FBI told the Senate 
Appropriations Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State and the Judiciary that the 
Trilogy project failed and the FBI wasted $104 million. During the hearing, FBI Director 
Robert S. Mueller III took some of the responsibility for the Trilogy catastrophe. He 
assigned the rest of the blame to vendor Science Applications International Corporation. 
The Department of Justice’s Inspector General’s Office produced a report that cited 
several reasons for the failure of the Trilogy project, including:  (1) Virtual Case File 
design modifications made as a result of the FBI’s shift from criminal investigations to 
preventing terrorism, following the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks; (2) poor management 
decisions early in the project; (3) inadequate project oversight, and (4) a lack of sound IT 
investment practices.15 
Trilogy limited the FBI’s ability to partner with other U.S. intelligence entities 
and fully share homeland security information.  A new system, SENTINEL, under 
development by the FBI, plans to transform the way the FBI does business, allowing the 
FBI to move from a paper-based reporting system to an electronic system of records, as 
well as eliminating the redundancy in maintaining multiple systems and bottlenecks.  
SENTINEL will provide a versatile capability to locate different types of information 
contained within SENTINEL. It will support the preparation and execution of a multitude  
of different search queries. This capability will be both flexible and powerful to 
accommodate the substantial volume and wide variety of information available for 
retrieval in SENTINEL.16 
 
                                                 
14 National Research Council, A Review of the FBI’s Trilogy Information Technologies Modernization 
Program, Computer Science and Telecommunications Board, National Academies Press, Washington, 
D.C., 2004. 
15 The Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, The Federal Bureau of Investigation’s 
Management of the Trilogy Information Technology Modernization Project, Audit Report Number 05-7, 
February 2005. 
16 “Information Technology Issues at FBI, Office of the Chief Information Officer”  
http://www.fedsources.com/events/download/ZalmaiAzmi.pdf (Accessed February 20, 2007). 
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5. The FBI Vision of an Interoperable Terror Information-Sharing 
Environment 
The Requirements and Information Metadata System (RIMS) can be integrated 
into SENTINEL with minimal impact.  RIMS uses the current FBI information 
technology structure.  SENTINEL will employ a service-oriented architecture that is 
compatible with the FBI’s Enterprise Architecture, which incorporates all of the FBI 
business functions.  SENTINEL will allow FBI personnel to employ intranet technologies 
to enter, organize, search, and retrieve information and to import, export, and share case-
related information. SENTINEL will replace the legacy system, Automated Case Support 
(ACS), and assimilate their functionality. SENTINEL will be capable of exchanging 
information with multiple systems internal to the FBI and will support information 
sharing with External Agencies.   
The FBI is involved in information acquisition and the workflow of information 
management—how information is acquired, who must act on it, how information of all 
types flows within the FBI, how it must be processed and analyzed, and what types of 
inferences must be drawn.  For information-intensive missions such as criminal 
investigation and counterterrorism, modern IT and its proper design and exploitation are 
critical contributors to truly effective processes.  Data must be organized and managed in 
a way to promote the effectiveness of FBI agents and intelligence analysts. Access 
capabilities required for intelligence analysis in order to determine possible events in the 
future are crucial to the FBI as it continues to build a viable domestic intelligence agency 
and supports the U.S. Intelligence Community (USIC). 
Three events depict how the FBI continues to strive for a versatile system which 
will provide powerful retrieval, information-capture, and cataloguing of huge quantities 
of information and data. 
1. The FBI created a new National Security Branch (NSB) within the 
FBI and under a single Executive Assistant Director.  This service would 
include the FBI’s Counterterrorism and Counterintelligence Divisions, along 
with the newly formed Weapons of Mass Destruction Directorate, and its 
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Directorate of Intelligence. The NSB would be subject to the coordination and 
budget authorities of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI). 
Impact:  In regards to the FBI’s NSB, the DNI has more power over the FBI’s 
intelligence activities – in theory.  On December 17, 2004, President George Bush 
signed the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004.17 
The IRTPA empowered the DNI to lead the Intelligence Community, which it 
defines as including the FBI’s intelligence elements mentioned above.  The FBI’s 
national security and intelligence missions are now unified under the authority of 
the Executive Assistant Director (EAD), Willie Hulon, who reports to the Deputy 
Director of the FBI.  The EAD-NSB has full operational and management 
authority over all FBI Headquarters and field national security programs, including 
the authority to initiate, terminate, or reallocate any of the investigations or other 
activities within the NSB.  The EAD-NSB has direct authority over the NSB 
budget, including the National Intelligence Program (NIP) resources.  The EAD-
NSB is also responsible for the continued development of a specialized national 
security workforce and is the lead FBI official responsible for coordination and 
liaison with the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and the Intelligence 
Community (IC). (The DNI is the head of the U.S. Intelligence Community and 
the principal advisor to the President, National Security Council, and Homeland 
Security Council on intelligence matters 
2. Trilogy Information Technology Modernization Program attempted 
to further the FBI’s ability to integrate its information. 
Impact:  The Trilogy Information Technology Modernization Program did not 
further the FBI’s ability to integrate its information thus continuing to limit the 
FBI’s ability to partner with other U.S. law enforcement and intelligence entities 
and fully share homeland security information.  Funding to optimize the FBI’s 
ability to contribute fully to U.S. intelligence efforts was not actualized prior to 
9/11 and subsequent attempts at technological progress within the FBI was stymied 
                                                 
17 Full background on the IRTPA can be found at the Library of Congress site: 
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d108:s.02845 (Accessed January 28, 2007).… 
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by bureaucratic, cultural, or monetary constraints.  A new system, SENTINEL, is 
in development which will leverage technology to improve the FBI’s ability to use 
the information in its possession. 
3. In the fall of 2005, the FBI embarked on a Domain Management 
Initiative (DMI) wherein five field offices were provided authority by FBIHQ 
to find innovative methods or systems to determine the offices’ domain using 
new technology methods to include “thinking outside the box.”  This 
innovative thinking led to the initial development of a ten to thirteen metadata 
code called Requirements and Information Metadata System (previously 
called “RICS” by one field office).  The use of the RIMS code is a method to 
identify, catalogue, and retrieve intelligence information within the FBI. 
Impact: Use of the RIMS metadata decreased the time FBI personnel needed to 
retrieve specific intelligence on documents which incorporated the code into the 
documents contents.18  The use of the RIMS metadata would improve information 
assurance by eliminating misspelled words and poor indexing.  RIMS would 
reduce the probability that a user of ACS would not retrieve vital information in a 
timely manner for analysis and making that link to a possible terrorist threat.  This 
innovative system is cost effective, having minimal impact on the FBI’s current 
information technology structure.  There are minimal new equipment costs to the 
FBI, and the system uses existing alpha and numeric codes familiar within the 
USIC and the U.S. government.  Additionally, since there are no formal 
cataloguing, metadata, or retrieval methods approved within the FBI this 
cataloguing and retrieval system was an immediate improvement to current FBI 
                                                 
18 See Thesis Chapter VII, “Requirements and Information Metadata System,” Section E, “RIMS as a 
Corporate Product?” for the results of focus group discussions involving RIMS users.  It was determined 
that RIMS allowed the users to find and retrieve data, determine relationships between such data and notify 
processed intelligent information to interested parties faster than typical word searches within ACS.   A 
RIMS search on the existing FBI Enterprise Architecture system allowed users to locate shared data items 
based on content or the structured attributes of RIMS.  RIMS facilitated the identification of associations 
between content, people, places, and organizations.  This collaboration service enabled multiple individuals 
to interact with each other on areas of mutual interest. These services crossed organizational program 
(counterterrorism, counterintelligence, cyber, or criminal) boundaries with rich content allowing formerly 
unknown linkages or anomalies to surface for quick analysis.  
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methods.  To date, five FBI field offices were involved and trained with this 
concept.  Positive interest from FBIHQ NSB entities occurred. 
 
In summary, the FBI continues to strive for a versatile system which will provide 
powerful information retrieval, capture, and cataloguing capabilities to its users.  The 
problem is this system is still in development within the FBI.  The threat of terrorist acts 
continues and every day large amounts of information and intelligence is collected within 
the FBI through various investigative methods from the FBI’s diverse program 
responsibilities. No central search platform exists for FBI analysts or investigators to use 
the information gathered or to data mine existing information in furtherance of the FBI’s 
Priorities.  An enterprise-wide standardized approach to classifying investigative 
information into a structured relational database environment is needed. 
D. RESEARCH QUESTION 
How can RIMS metadata be developed and implemented in the FBI in order to 
have a central search platform for use by FBI analysts or investigators to gather or data 
mine existing information in furtherance of the FBI’s Priorities? 
E. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH AND RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 
The use of the RIMS code is a method to capture, catalogue, and retrieve 
intelligence information within the FBI.  Currently, there are no formal cataloguing, 
metadata, or retrieval methods approved within the FBI.  Agents and analysts rely on 
searching paper files or using unstructured text searches within the current Automated 
Case System (ACS).  The use of the RIMS metadata to capture, catalogue, and retrieve 
intelligence information within the FBI would improve information assurance and 
accuracy by eliminating misspelled words and poor indexing of information.  RIMS 
would reduce the probability that a user of ACS would not retrieve vital information in a 




RIMS would provide results from a central search platform and enable the ACS 
user to data mine within a genre of information.  This type of intelligence tagging system 
will better capture, catalogue, and retrieve information at a high probability of detection 
and prevention. 
Furthermore, within the USIC the RIMS code can be adapted to ensure 
commonality and uniformity in retrieval, cataloguing, and capturing of intelligence 
information.  The use of the RIMS code can be manipulated into a non-classified code for 
use by state and local law enforcement and intelligence entities for integration into the 
USIC’s knowledge base.  The RIMS code can be adaptable and flexible throughout the 
intelligence community and with local/state entities working within the homeland 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW — INFORMATION SHARING 
Successful surprise attacks in modern warfare are not always a surprise.  The 
recipients already possessed information suggesting that the attack was oncoming.  
Among such “intelligence failures” by recipients are the 1940 German invasions of 
Norway and France and the Soviet Union in 1941, the 1941 Japanese navy’s attack on the 
American fleet at Pearl Harbor, the 1944 German attack on Allied forces in Ardenne, 
1967 Egyptian preemptive attack on Israel, the 1968 Tet Offensive by the North 
Vietnamese and Viet Cong, and the 1973 Egyptian attack in the Sinai against Israeli 
forces.  In each example, post attack analysis revealed that essential information had 
already been collected by the recipient’s intelligence agencies but the information was 
ignored, lost, interpreted in a limited fashion, or completely negated.  If assessed or 
disseminated properly, the recipient should have been able to disrupt or even prevent 
attacks.  So prevalent were these failures that some analysts concluded that the failures 
are simply to be expected; as Richard K. Betts put it, “Intelligence failures are not only 
inevitable, they are natural.”19 
Other analysts argue that intelligence failures are not so inevitable and not always 
successful.  For example, Ariel Levite cites the surprise attack in 1942 on Midway Island 
which intended to lure the U.S. fleet into a decisive open-seas battle and which Japan 
expected to win.  The Japanese attacks was decisively defeated by the U.S. Navy’s own 
surprise counterattack, made possible by deciphering of some of the Japanese navy’s 
communication codes.20 
Concerning terror attacks on the U.S., the debate continues today.  In 1993, 
terrorists launched an attack on one of the World Trade Center towers in New York City; 
the attack was only partially successful but did not bring the building down as intended.  
Other terror events such as the attempt to blow up the Lincoln and Holland tunnels, the 
George Washington Bridge, the United Nations, and the FBI’s New York Field Office in 
                                                 
19 Richard K. Betts, “Analysis, War, and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures Are Inevitable,” 31, 
World Politics (1978): 61-80. 
20 Ariel Levite,  Intelligence and Strategic Surprises (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987).  
 16
Manhattan were prevented by American intelligence and law enforcement.  At the 
Millennium, terror attacks were stymied.  Nonetheless, on September 11, 2001, surprise 
terror attacks were launched in the U.S., which killed many, severely damaged the 
Pentagon and destroyed the World Trade Center towers.  In sum, there have been surprise 
terror attacks in the U.S. and information has been discovered that revealed the USIC had 
in their possession the information but were not properly assessed and dissemination. 
A huge amount of literature exists on intelligence organizations and their role in 
national security decision-making processes.  It has generated a huge number of 
hypotheses about the cause of intelligence failures.  Levite lists general explanations such 
as individual failures in correctly assessing intelligence information, intelligence failures 
stemming from the interaction of humans in small groups, intelligence failures due to 
bureaucratic politics, and intelligence failures involving limitations on learning and 
information processing by individuals and organizations. 
There are three broad schools of thought in regards to the ongoing debate over 
9/11 and intelligence failures.  The most prominent school or viewpoint notes the 
inherent institutional structure of the intelligence community since Pearl Harbor.  At that 
time, the failure was due to the lack of a unified intelligence command and trained 
analysts and the lack of a unified military command structure which disseminates to 
policymakers all collected information and all analytical production.  The first post-war 
institutional reforms included a unified command within the Central Intelligence Agency, 
the Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the National Security Council to 
aid the president utilize the information and advise on national security issues.  As 
Sherman Kent, a Yale historian and former officer with the Office of Special Services 
during World War II and author of one of the earliest treatises on intelligence, Strategic 
Intelligence for American World Policy, observed “the intelligence of grand strategy and 






government; it is produced through complicated machinery and intense purposeful 
effort.”21  What allows this debate to continue is the simple fact that most key structural 
issues remain unsolved. 
A second general school of thought stresses the tradeoff any particular structural 
choice necessarily involves.  For example, in Betts article referenced above, he argues 
that organizational solutions to intelligence failure are hampered by three basic problems, 
“the first dealing with procedural reforms addressing specific pathologies accenting other 
pathologies.”22 In order to fulfill present circumstances, policymakers structure their 
government to work against particular immediate defects.  This is a criticism of Betts. 
Flexibility in adapting habits, which one day are relevant while the next day are not, 
requires different types of performance. 
A third general school of thought downplays the impact of structure and 
highlights the importance of motivation and quality of analysts.  Policymakers are 
receptive to information and advice from the intelligence community. For example, Betts 
states, “Intelligence failure is political and psychological more often than 
organizational…Intelligence can be improved marginally, but not radically, by altering 
the analytic system…The use of intelligence depends less on the bureaucracy than on the 
intellects and inclinations of the authorities about it.”23 
The fact that most descriptions of the nature of the process by which information 
is gathered and used virtually ignores the problem of storage of the information is 
symptomatic.  Gregory F. Treveron refers to the “real” intelligence cycle in which (1) 
“Intelligence infers needs,” (2) “Tasking and collection” occur, (3) “Raw intelligence” is 
collected, (4) “Processing and analysis” occur, (5) “Policy receives and reacts” and the 
cycle starts all over again.24  Bruce D. Berkowitz and Allan E. Goodman also refer to 
                                                 
21 Sherman Kent, Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1951). 
22 Betts, “Analysis, War, and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures Are Inevitable” 31: 61-80. 
23 Gregory F. Treverton, Reshaping National Intelligence for an Age of Information (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001) 15. 
24.Bruce D. Berkowitz and Allan E. Goodman, Strategic Intelligence for American National Security 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989). 
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“the intelligence cycle” which includes “Step I: Determining the Information Intelligence 
Consumers Require,” “Step II: Collection,” “Step III:  Analysis and Coordination of 
Assessments Results,” and “Step IV: Dissemination of the Product.”  Mark M. Lowenthal 
states a cycle consisting of “Requirements,” “Collection,” “Processing and Exploitation,” 
“Analysis and Production,” “Dissemination,” and “Consumption,” and even cites a 1993 
publication by the CIA, titled A Consumer’s Handbook to Intelligence (September 1993), 
which depicts a cycle consisting of “Planning and Direction,” “Collection,” “Processing 
and Exploitation,” “Analysis and Production,” and “Dissemination.”25  As should be 
apparent, there is virtually no mention of precisely what happens to the intelligence 
information after it has been collected but before it is assessed and analyzed.   
In the congressional hearings on 9/11, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul 
Wolfowitz remarked on September 19, 2002, “We also need to address a relatively new 
problem, what I’ll call “information discovery.”26 Many agencies collect intelligence and 
a lot of agencies analyze intelligence, but no one is responsible for the “bridge” between 
collection and analysis.  Who in the intelligence community is responsible for tagging, 
cataloguing, indexing, storing, retrieving, and correlating data or for facilitating 
collaboration involving many different agencies? Given the volume of information we 
sift through to separate signal from noise, this function is now critical.  We cannot 
neglect it.” 
In the congressional hearings on 9/11, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul 
Wolfowitz remarked on September 19, 2002, “We also need to address a relatively new 
problem, what I’ll call “information discovery.”27 Many agencies collect intelligence and 
a lot of agencies analyze intelligence, but no one is responsible for the “bridge” between 
collection and analysis.  Who in the intelligence community is responsible for tagging, 
cataloguing, indexing, storing, retrieving, and correlating data or for facilitating  
 
                                                 
25 Mark M. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2003). 
26 The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon 
the United States (New York: W.W. Norton & Co, n.d.). 
27 The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon 
the United States (New York: W.W. Norton & Co, n.d.). 
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collaboration involving many different agencies? Given the volume of information we 
sift through to separate signal from noise, this function is now critical.  We cannot 
neglect it.” 
There is not established linkage between the structures of intelligence 
organizations and the structure of the resulting intelligence.  Most descriptions of the 
process by which information is gathered and used virtually ignore the problem of 
storage and retrieval of information.  For example, Gregory F. Treverton, refers to “real 
intelligence cycle in which (1) Intelligence infers a need, (2) Tasking and Collection 
occur, (3) Raw intelligence is collected, (4) Processing and analysis occurs, and (5) 
Policy is obtained and reaction is given.28  The cycle starts again.  There is no mention of 
what happens to the intelligence information after it is collected but before assessed and 
analyzed. 
Observation from Senator Richard Shelby (Republican-Alabama), Vice Chairman 
of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, in an extensive set of “Additional Views” 
submitted along with the Joint Inquiry’s “Findings and Conclusions” and 
“Recommendations”29 on December 10, 2002 which were critical of many different 
elements of the intelligence community and were echoed by the Joint Inquiry staff 
reports.  Senator Shelby focused on the FBI and the problem of storage and cataloguing 
of information which inhibited information retrieval by the FBI and other agencies.  
Senator Shelby concluded the FBI’s approach to intelligence analysis was unsuited to any 
long-term strategic analytical work and is inappropriate to counterterrorism analysis.  
Exacerbating these problems were what the Senator called the FBI’s “Technological 
Dysfunctions” since the FBI never took IT seriously thus finding itself with an obsolete 
IT infrastructure totally inadequate to the FBI’s current operational needs much less in 
support to all-source intelligence fusion and analysis.  So the problem of organizational 
design is to confront and manage what Steve Chan noted about the nature of warming 
                                                 
28 Gregory F. Treverton, Reshaping National Intelligence for an Age of Information, 16. 
29 These materials are all available on http://intelligence.senate.gov/hr107.htm (Accessed June 12, 
2006). 
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signs about surprise attack, “In the real world of strategic analysis, warning signs are 
usually scattered across individual and bureaucratic units.”30 
To avoid future scattering of information and the unrecognized warning signs of a 
surprise attack, a seamless environment was needed.  The RIMS mission requirement was 
to provide an environment that was seamless regardless of seams created by the national 
security classifications of information or the physical separation of existing networks 
(FBI offices). RIMS was a cross-domain (counterterrorism, counterintelligence, cyber 
and criminal programs) solution for the exchange of information between the different 
security levels and programs within the FBI.   
 
 
                                                 
30  Steve Chan, “The Intelligence of Stupidity: Understanding Failures in Strategic Warning.” 
American Political Science Review (1979), 73: 171-180.  
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III. TENTATIVE SOLUTIONS — RIMS 
On January 1, 2006, the RIMS code was initiated on all communications 
containing intelligence information within the Pittsburgh Field Office of the FBI.  On 
February 16, 2006, the RIMS system was briefed to four other FBI field offices:  San 
Francisco, Miami, Charlotte, and Little Rock.  Training by Pittsburgh personnel was 
provided the field offices.  Additionally, FBI Headquarter personnel from the Directorate 
of Intelligence were also provided a briefing and training on the RIMS code.  The four 
field offices agreed to test the RIMS codes on future communications.  Members from 
FBI Headquarters, Directorate of Intelligence, received the RIMS code positively, 
agreeing to study it further at the FBI Headquarters level. 
 
The following assumptions can be made from the use of the RIMS code: 
 
* With the proper governance, the use of the RIMS code will capture, 
catalogue, and retrieve information with increased accuracy and 
effectiveness while decreasing the probability of uncertainty. 
 
*The use of the RIMS code is cost effective and will have minimal 
impact on the FBI’s current Information Technology structure and  not 
radically affect the FBI’s future Information Technology structure, 
SENTINEL.31 
 
*The use of the RIMS code can be adapted for use by the entire USIC for 
commonality and uniformity in retrieval, cataloguing, and collecting of 
intelligence information. 
 
*The use of the RIMS code can be manipulated into a non-classified code 
for utilization by state, local, and tribal law enforcement and 
intelligence entities. 
 
This paper will verify if the RIMS code will be an effective and efficient method 
to capture, catalogue and retrieve intelligence information within the FBI.   
                                                 
31 No new hardware or software is needed and there are minimal new equipment costs to the FBI.  
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IV. METHODOLOGY 
The thesis is composed of eight chapters. The first chapter, the introduction, 
describes the motivation for the thesis. The second chapter is a review of the literature 
available on the topic of information sharing and collaboration.  Chapter III defines the 
proposed solution to the thesis – the Requirements and Information Metadata System.  
The fourth chapter is the chapter overview while Chapter V goes into the history of the 
FBI, its current mission and homeland security function.  The chapter also addresses the 
FBI’s cultural resistance and current information sharing and collaboration topics.  
Chapter VI includes and extensive analysis and discussion of the FBI and Information 
Technology.  The seventh chapter provides extensive information concerning the 
Requirements and Information Metadata System (RIMS).  The eighth chapter presents a 
summary of the thesis findings along with future research topics. 
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V. THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION 
A. HISTORY 
On July 26, 1908, Attorney General Charles J. Bonaparte ordered a small force of 
permanent investigators to report to the Department of Justice’s Chief Examiner, Stanley 
Finch.  Except for certain bank frauds, all Department of Justice (DOJ) investigations 
were reported to his new group of detectives.  Initially, little seemed to come of 
Bonaparte’s reorganization.32 
This small special agent force evolved into the FBI, the primary federal law 
enforcement agency in the U.S.33  Initially staffed to investigate antitrust matters, 
copyright violations, land fraud, and twenty one other matters, the FBI today investigates 
criminal and security threats within the U.S. along with the emerging international face of 
crime by aggressively building bridges between U.S. and foreign law enforcement.  The 
FBI expanded its Legal Attache program; provided professional law enforcement 
education to foreign nationals through the International Law Enforcement Academy in 
Budapest and other international education efforts; and created working groups and other 
structured liaisons with foreign law enforcement.  On September 4, 2001, former U.S. 
Attorney Robert S. Mueller III (2001 to present) was sworn in as Director with a mandate 
to address a number of challenges such as upgrading the FBI’s information technology 
infrastructure, addressing records management issues, and enhancing FBI foreign 
counterintelligence analysis and security in the wake of the damage done by former 
Special Agent and convicted spy Robert S. Hanssen.34 
 
 
                                                 
32 FBI Public Website.  http://www.fbi.gov/libref/historic/history/test.htm  (Accessed  September 30, 
2006). 
33 Ibid. 
34 Athan G. Theoharis, Tony G. Poveda, Susan Rosenfeld, and Richard Gid Powers, The FBI: A 
Comprehensive Reference Guide (New York: Oryx Press, 2000). 
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B. TODAY’S FBI:  CHANGING TO MEET EVOLVING THREATS 
On September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks were launched against New York and 
Washington, D.C.  On October 26, 2001, the president signed into law the U.S. Patriot 
Act, which granted new provisions to address the threat of terrorism. On May 29, 2002, 
the attorney general issued revised investigative guidelines to assist the FBI’s 
counterterrorism efforts.  To support the FBI’s change in mission and to meet newly 
articulated strategic priorities, Director Mueller called for a reengineering of FBI 
structure and operations that would closely focus the FBI on prevention of terrorist 
attacks, on countering foreign intelligence operations against the U.S., and on addressing 
cyber crime-based attacks and other high technology crimes.  Additionally, the FBI 
remained dedicated to protecting civil rights, combating public corruption, organized 
crime, white-collar crime, and major acts of violent crime.  The FBI continued to 
strengthen its support to federal, county, municipal, and international law enforcement 
partners.  Also, it is dedicated to upgrading its technological infrastructure to successfully 
meet each of its priorities, as noted below. 
Over the past five years, the FBI has transformed itself to meet evolving threats. 
The FBI enhanced its operational and intelligence capabilities, and adopted a strategic 
approach to human resources, IT, science and technology, facilities and budget.  These 
changes, highlighted below, have aided the FBI emerge within the Homeland Security35 
field as a viable partner in the defense of America. 
1. Prevention/Investigation of Terrorist Acts 
• Lead law enforcement agency for all terrorism investigations; as same time, 
committed partner who works with host of federal, state, local agencies 
• Preventing terrorist attacks is the FBI’s number one priority.  Strategies:  Root 
out & shut down sleeper cells in U.S. using all available tools; Identify 
individual sympathetic with terrorists but not part of organized group; Disrupt 
terrorist logistical structures, including financial support; Help track down 
terrorist leaders/operatives worldwide; Provide security/support for major 
special events (Olympics etc.) 
                                                 
35 FBI Public Website.  http://www.fbi.gov/fbihistory.htm  (Accessed September 30, 2006).  
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• When attacks do occur, the FBI quickly responds:  Sends teams of agents, 
bomb technicians, etc. to the site to assist victims, manage crime scene, launch 
investigations; agents worldwide to run down leads; and activates command 
posts to coordinate FBI efforts 
• The FBI leads numerous inter-agency Joint Terrorism Task Forces, which 
pool expertise and resources and are a key weapon in fighting terrorism in the 
U.S. 
2. Intelligence/Information Sharing 
• Gather, analyze, and share intelligence on terrorists, terrorist activities, and 
terrorist groups with government leaders, intelligence community, and 
national/international law enforcement entities. 
3. Weapons of Mass Destruction 
• Lead federal agency for investigating threats/use of WMD (anthrax) 
• Conduct threat assessments, deploy Hazmat teams, collect evidence etc. 
• WMD Coordinators in each field office serve as focal point for local response 
• Strong partnerships at a federal, state, local levels including with the military, 
law enforcement, fire, emergency, public health, and medical communities 
• Conduct field/table top exercises and provide training to a variety of officials 
4. Threat Analysis and Warning 
• Analyze threats against U.S. in partnership with intelligence community 
• Work closely with DHS to determine national threat level and response 
• Share threat information/alerts with government/law enforcement/ private 
sector  
5. FBI Priorities36 
In executing the following priorities, the FBI will produce and use intelligence to 
protect the nation from threats and to bring to justice those who violate the law.  
• Protect the United States from terrorist attack. 
• Protect the United States against foreign intelligence operations and 
espionage. 
• Protect the United States against cyber-based attacks and high-technology 
crimes. 
• Combat public corruption at all levels. 
• Protect civil rights. 
• Combat transnational and national criminal organizations and enterprises. 
                                                 
36 FBI Public Website.  http://www.fbi.gov/priorities/priorities.htm   (Accessed September 30, 2006). 
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• Combat major white-collar crime. 
• Combat significant violent crime. 
• Support federal, state, county, municipal, and international partners.  
• 10. Upgrade technology to successfully perform the FBI's mission.  
 
In summary, the FBI is changing to meet evolving threats.  Infrastructure changes 
within the FBI included the modernization of the FBI Information Technology 
Infrastructure (SENTINEL) with new networks.  The FBI centralized databases with 
modern search tools and improved connectivity with law enforcement and intelligence 
community partners.  The FBI institutionalized the strategic information technology 
planning processes and utilized performance-based contracting and centralized 
information technology contract management.   
Furthermore, FBI process changes include moving beyond case-focused 
intelligence gathering and analysis to knowing the FBI’s domain thus centralizing and 
enhancing the management of national programs. The FBI utilizes a full range of 
investigative tools against criminal and terrorist elements by enhancing human source 
reporting, modernizing records management, improving security practices, training and 
education and establishing clear lines of accountability to ensure day-to-day operations 
support the FBI’s strategies. 
C. THE FBI’S CULTURAL RESISTANCE TO INFORMATION SHARING 
There is a continuing and heightened need for better and more effective and 
comprehensive information sharing.37 The intelligence community needs to move from a 
culture of “need to know” to “need to share.” The 9/11 Commission made observations 
regarding information sharing, and recommended procedures to provide incentives for 
sharing and creating a “trusted information network.” Many Commission 
recommendations address the need to improve information and intelligence collection, 
sharing, and analysis within the intelligence community itself. It is imperative that the 
purpose of improving information analysis and sharing is to provide better information 
                                                 
37 Comptroller General of the United States, David M. Walker, Statement before the Committee on 
Government Reform, House of Representatives, August 3, 2004  (See GAO-04-1033T). 
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throughout the federal government, and ultimately also to state and local  
governments, the private sector, and our citizens. 
The FBI was one of several government entities that portrayed cultural resistance 
after September 11, 2001, to sharing information and collaborating.38  Differing 
terminologies initially caused problems in communicating the appropriate information to 
outside agencies which included the severity or immediacy of the information.  Other 
cultural resistance factors included: lack of trust when information is shared; fear that 
shared data will be misused; fear that shared data will be misinterpreted; fear that shared 
data will be used to beat collector to wider dissemination; low trust that they are 
receiving all available information; do not trust reliability of information shared; do not 
trust products, want raw data and ability to conduct own/alternative analysis; and fear of 
sharing data in violation of privacy laws.39 
D. INFORMATION SHARING AND COLLABORATION 
With the FBI’s dual mission, it is increasingly important to have effective 
information sharing within the FBI and across organizations such as law enforcement and 
intelligence agencies with different objectives and perspectives  This “means sharing the 
right information, at the right level of detail, using the right language, at the right time, in 
the right context, with the right people. A failure related to any one of these factors can 
lead to an information-sharing breakdown. Supporting the effective use of shared 
information is even more complex because access to information does not necessarily 
lead to effective knowledge sharing and collaboration. When users from different 
communities share information, they interpret that knowledge in new contexts, 
transforming and creating new knowledge, while at the same time contributing toward 
the development of the communities grounding that knowledge.”40 
                                                 
38 Partial Recall, “Effective Culture Change in the FBI,” http://robfay.com/2005/06/15/effective-
culture-change-in-the-fbi/  (Accessed December 15, 2006) 
39 CIO Executive Council, The Professional Organization for CIOs, “Why the G-Men Aren’t I.T. 
Men,” http://www.cio.com/archive/061505/gmen.html  (Accessed January 3, 2007) 
40 Peter A. Kind and J. Katharine Burton, “Information Sharing and Collaboration Business Plan,” 
Institute for Defense Analysis, June 2005.  
 30
In a document prepared by Peter Kind and Katharine Burton for the Institute for 
Defense Analyses, the authors note information sharing and collaboration is a daunting 
challenge within the U.S. Intelligence Community.  There is a full range of stakeholders 
throughout all government agencies and levels, private sector and cooperating allies and 
at appropriate levels of information security classification approaches.  Nonetheless, it 
must be done to accomplish effective homeland security. Kind and Burton state: 
Enabling, encouraging, and facilitating information sharing and 
collaboration require different supportive mechanisms culturally and 
technologically. Enabling information sharing is the first step, involving 
cross-organizational access to information according to sharing policies 
and procedures. But access to information does not necessarily lead to 
effective knowledge sharing and collaboration. When people share 
knowledge, they are not just sharing information; they are also sharing 
cultural and social references. Likewise, when people seek knowledge, 
they are not just seeking information; they are seeking information 
grounded in, and carrying different meanings to different social 
communities. Information is viewed, perceived, and used differently by 
each community. 
When users from different communities share information, they interpret 
that knowledge in new contexts, transforming and creating new 
knowledge, while at the same time contributing toward the identity of the 
communities grounding that knowledge. The role of the information-
sharing environment, then, is to encourage, support, mediate, and guide 
this cyclic process of community development through knowledge 
seeking, sharing, joint understanding, and social knowledge building. In 
this way, data is contextualized and transformed into information, which is 
in turn shared, interpreted, and socially transformed into knowledge. As 
this knowledge is developed and integrated and used by components that 
operate collaboratively, it is understood and given different meanings and 
applications.41 
For the FBI to be an effective member of the U.S. Intelligence Community and to 
partner with various law enforcement entities, the FBI must effectively share information 
across the FBI and with organizations such as law enforcement and intelligence agencies 
with different objectives and perspectives.  The use of RIMS will allow the different  
 
                                                 
41 Kind and Burton, “Information Sharing and Collaboration Business Plan,”  7-8. 
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communities, inside the FBI and outside, to share information, interpret the information 
in a similar way, and create cooperative knowledge banks based upon the common shared 
information provided by RIMS. 
E. FLEXIBILITY 
The culture of the FBI is now and always has been a culture of hard work, 
integrity, and dedication to protecting the U.S., no matter the challenges facing the FBI.  
The FBI was created 99 years ago to fight the spread of traditional crime across county 
and state lines.  Today, the FBI faces a world in which crimes are as diverse as terrorism, 
corporate fraud, identity theft, human trafficking, illegal weapons trade, and money 
laundering across international boundaries.  The FBI now deals with organized crime 
groups that launder money for drug groups that sell weapons to terrorists, who commit 
white-collar crime to fund their operations.  With the terror attacks on September 11, 
2001, it became clear that the FBI must be more flexible, agile, and mobile in the face of 
these new threats.  As a result, the FBI refocused its mission and revised its priorities; 
realigned its workforce to address these priorities; shifted its management and operational 
environment to strengthen flexibility, agility, and accountability; restructured FBI 
Headquarters; and initiated many projects aimed at reengineering the FBI’s internal 
business practices and processes.   
The FBI’s new refocused mission and revised priorities allowed creative 
processes to be explored by field divisions to address the FBI’s new threats.  The RIMS 
system was a new system that promoted an immediate interoperable terrorism 
information-sharing environment.  This system was created by the investigators who 
worked the threats and understood the importance of a system that would not inhibit their 
current workloads, but add value to their investigations.  It was important that this system 
be available to FBI personnel without added cost, new technology, or security 
roadblocks.  It effectively supported the detection, prevention, disruption, preemption, 
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VI. INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND THE FBI 
A. INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ADVANCEMENTS 
FBI Director Robert S. Mueller III, in a statement before the Senate 
Appropriations Committee, advised that in September 2001, the FBI’s technology 
systems were several generations behind industry standards; existing legacy systems were 
nearly 30 years old.  Information Technology (IT) equipment was inadequate.  
For example, our personnel were working on hand-me-down computers 
from other federal agencies.  We had little to no Internet connections in 
our field offices, and our networks could not do something as simple as 
transmit a digital photo.42 
Following the September 11 terrorist attacks, we were required to make an 
in-depth assessment of our information technology systems.  This 
assessment determined that we needed to address some key areas 
including the lack of databases that contained current information, limited 
analytical tools, continual dependency on Automated Case Support (ACS), 
and outdated equipment.43 
The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) completed a study 
concerning the FBI’s process of modernizing its information technology (IT) systems. 
Replacing much of its 1980’s-based technology with modern system applications and a 
robust technical infrastructure, this modernization is intended to enable the FBI to take an 
integrated approach—coordinated agency-wide—to performing its critical missions, such 
as federal crime investigation and terrorism prevention. The GAO conducted a series of 
reviews of the FBI’s modernization management. The objective of this review was to 
determine whether the FBI has an enterprise architecture to guide and constrain 
modernization investments.44 
                                                 
42 FBI Director Robert S. Mueller III, Statement before the Senate Appropriations Committee, 
Subcommittee on the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies,  
March 23, 2004. 
43 Ibid. 
44 U.S. Government Accountability Office, FBI Reorganization:  Information Technology:  FBI Needs 
An Enterprise Architecture To Guide Its Modernization Activities, GAO-03-959. Washington, D.C: 
September 2003. 
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The report noted that in order for the FBI to become an intelligence-driven 
organization it must have the IT and information-based capabilities in place to support an 
enterprise-wide intelligence focus.  IT must be available to support established and 
validated intelligence requirements including the collection, fusion, storage, retrieval, 
analysis, exploitation, and dissemination of both raw and finished intelligence products.  
Full support for these capabilities must occur for all missions and lines of business; these 
include analysis, investigation, audit, security, and internal management operations and 
initiatives. 
The FBI must develop an expanded, technologically-oriented infrastructure and 
increase its abilities to plan, acquire, manage, and deploy information-based capabilities 
in order to maximize the FBI’s operational effectiveness, yet conserve scarce resources.  
Innovation should be encouraged with outsourcing of IT services, and capabilities should 
be used to leverage industry capabilities and optimize the available resources to develop 
and deploy needed capabilities and infrastructure.45 
The FBI’s Strategic Plan46 notes the FBI’s greatest challenges will be to further 
improve its intelligence capabilities and strengthen its information technology 
infrastructure. To achieve its vision of becoming a proactive, threat-based organization, 
the FBI must upgrade its technology infrastructure and capabilities to meet the pace of its 
adversaries.  It must also provide enterprise-wide threat-prioritized access to data and 
information from a resilient infrastructure which is resistant to attacks, disasters, and 
other circumstances which could negatively impact operations and mission success.  The 
FBI must implement enterprise architecture that requires shared data storage and multiple 
access mechanisms. It must support access to information at all security levels and 
classifications, by properly authorized individuals and organizations at all times.  This 
would include the need for data storage, user identity management, and interoperable 
                                                 
45 U.S. Government Accountability Office, GAO Highlights, “Information Technology — FBI is 
Building Management Capabilities Essential to Successful System Deployments, but Challenges Remain,” 
http://www.gao.gov/highlights/d051014thigh.pdf. 
46 FBI Public Website. http://www.fbi.gov/publications/strategicplan/stategicplantext.htm#it 
(Accessed January 15, 2007). 
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information-sharing systems across a global information infrastructure of networks and 
systems.  Some of these networks and systems are not owned or operated by the FBI. 
The FBI Strategic Plan further notes the FBI’s IT structure must allow the sharing 
of information quickly, easily, and appropriately within the FBI and with its partners.  
Interoperability with the information systems and networks of the FBI’s partners must 
facilitate the sharing of information by providing search, request, and retrieval 
capabilities that are accessible to its partners for both intelligence and operational 
purposes.  RIMS provides quick access to specific information through a simple search of 
available FBI databases.  Retrieval capabilities are simple and quick, mimicking a Google 
word search. 
B. SENTINEL AND INFORMATION MANAGEMENT 
The Trilogy Information Technology Modernization Program (Trilogy) did not 
further the FBI’s ability to integrate its information thus continuing to limit the FBI’s 
ability to partner with other U.S. intelligence entities and fully share homeland security 
information. The well publicized FBI Trilogy Program did not provide an effective return 
on the FBI’s IT investment (measured in operational terms—more and better results, 
increased responsiveness and agility, and improved efficiency of operations).  Trilogy 
limited the FBI’s ability to partner with other U.S. intelligence entities and fully share 
homeland security information.  A new system, SENTINEL, under development by the 
FBI plans to transform the way the FBI does business, allowing the FBI to move from a 
paper-based reporting system to an electronic system of records, as well as eliminating 
the redundancy in maintaining multiple systems and bottlenecks.  It will leverage 
technology to improve the FBI’s ability to use the information in its possession. 
SENTINEL will provide a versatile capability to locate different types of information 
contained within SENTINEL. It will support the preparation and execution of a multitude 
of different search queries. This capability will be both flexible and powerful to 
accommodate the substantial volume and wide variety of information available for 
retrieval in SENTINEL. 
 36
In a March 16, 2006, press release by the FBI Press Office, FBI Director Robert 
S. Mueller III said, “SENTINEL will strengthen the FBI’s capabilities by replacing its 
primarily paper-based reporting system with an electronic system designed for 
information sharing. SENTINEL will support our current priorities, including our number 
one priority: preventing terrorist attacks. At the same time, the system will be flexible and 
adaptable, to address future technological advances and changes in our mission and threat 
environment.”  
SENTINEL will deliver an electronic information management system, automate 
workflow processes for the first time, and provide a user-friendly web-based interface to 
access and search across multiple databases. SENTINEL will help the FBI manage 
information beyond the case-focus of the existing ACS, and will provide enhanced 
information sharing, search, and analysis capabilities. SENTINEL will also facilitate 
information sharing with members of the law enforcement and intelligence communities.  
The SENTINEL program will be developed and deployed over time—in four 
phases—with each phase introducing new capabilities. Existing information will be 
migrated to the new system throughout the phases so that selected systems can be retired 
by the end of the fourth phase.  
SENTINEL provides information-based capabilities that support identification, 
collection, evaluation, analysis, and dissemination of investigative information.  Using 
SENTINEL, the FBI will maximize the sharing of information both internally and 
externally with its intelligence and law enforcement communities while ensuring that 
sensitive and classified information is appropriately protected against unauthorized 
disclosure. 
SENTINEL is an enterprise system which, when fully implemented, will benefit 
all FBI operational divisions.  Information Management applies to all of the systems 
required by the FBI’s operational and support divisions.  SENTINEL will allow the FBI’s 
intelligence organization to be “matrixed” across the entire FBI to support its IT 
structure.  System components must be designed to support intelligence functions.   
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Additionally, the consolidation of existing legacy systems and databases will also be a 
high priority in the design of new systems and databases which will reduce legacy costs 
and ensure a wider access of critical data. 
C. INFORMATION SHARING 
Executive Order 13356, “Strengthening the Sharing of Terrorism Information to 
Protect Americans,” a federal-level information-sharing mandate, has changed the ways 
in which information is obtained, processed, and used within the law enforcement and 
intelligence communities.  Increased requirements for implementation and integration of 
information assurance and access controls to protect FBI information and repositories 
from unauthorized access or exploitation has provided increased access to information-
sharing partners.  The successful implementation of this plan is a key step toward 
achieving the FBI’s vision for secure, interoperable, any time, any location access to 
information products and services both internal (FBI) and externally with the FBI’s 
partners across the federal government, including the Intelligence Community, and with 
state, local, and tribal governments. 
Information-sharing mandates levied by the U.S. Congress, the president, the 
director of national intelligence (DNI) and the attorney general created new challenges 
for the FBI, as a member of the U.S. intelligence community, to use IT infrastructure to 
share information both internally and externally in support of investigative, intelligence, 
and law enforcement missions and national intelligence priorities established by the DNI.  
External information sharing includes state, local, tribal, and international organizations 
that are authorized to receive FBI information.  The FBI’s information infrastructure 
must provide pathways and network interconnections for transmitting and receiving 
information to and from these external partners.  This infrastructure must also provide the 
technologies and procedures necessary to provide requisite levels of information 
assurance.  Of course, protected or sensitive information must be made available to 
authorized partners in accordance with established procedures and agreements. The 
RIMS system provides the requisite level of information assurance by standardizing the  
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meta data, which is necessary for an accurate and faster search. RIMS is already available 
to authorized partners and uses the existing software and hardware, which eliminates any 
need to establish new procedures or agreements. 
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VII. REQUIREMENTS AND INFORMATION METADATA 
SYSTEM 
A. GENESIS OF THE REQUIREMENTS AND INFORMATION 
METADATA SYSTEM (RIMS) 
In the fall of 2005, the FBI embarked on a Domain Management Initiative (DMI) 
wherein five FBI field offices were provided authority by FBI Headquarters to find 
innovative methods or systems to understand the offices’ domain using new technology 
methods to include “thinking outside the box.”  To understand an office’s domain, 
massive amounts of information had to be gained from numerous sources and from field 
work of investigators and analysts.  This information had to be formally catalogued, 
analyzed, and again retrieved in full in order to complete threat assessments involving an 
office’s domain or territory.  With time constraints to complete the domain projects along 
with no additional capital expenditures by the FBI on the projects, a new method to 
capture, catalogue, and accurately and fully retrieve intelligence information had to be 
developed.  Visionary leadership and innovative thinking in one field office led to the 
initial development of a ten to thirteen metadata code called the Requirements and 
Information Metadata System (previously called “RICS” by one field office).  The use of 
the RIMS code was a method to identify, catalogue, and retrieve intelligence information 
within the FBI. 
The RIMS code design had to be simple and easily adapted for quick use and 
understanding by FBI personnel.  The RIMS code is a method to capture, catalogue, and 
retrieve intelligence information within the FBI.  It would provide results from a central 
search platform and enable the ACS user to data mine within a genre of information.  
Currently, there are no formal cataloguing, metadata, or retrieval methods approved 
within the FBI.  Agents and analysts rely on searching paper files or using unstructured 
text searches within the current ACS system.  The use of the RIMS metadata to capture, 
catalogue, and retrieve intelligence information within the FBI would improve 
information assurance by eliminating misspelled words and poor indexing.  RIMS would 
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reduce the probability that a user of ACS would not retrieve vital information in a timely 
manner for analysis and making that link to a possible terrorist threat. 
The RIMS code aids in cataloguing the huge amounts of information the FBI 
collects on a daily basis and in the rapid retrieval of information.  To simply explain, the 
RIMS metadata system is similar to a Vehicle Identification Number (VIN).  It should be 
no less than 10 digits and as much as 13 digits and is alpha-numeric.   
With an eye to the future and a possible expanded national use, the RIMS code 
used a variety of documents from numerous agencies to create specific codes, designed to 
start with a broad category or topic area and end with a very specific target group, 
activity, or area.  Each alpha-numeric space holder holds critical information which 
identifies specific information to be used in research and analysis.  The codes, guides, 
and charts used to create RIMS reflected the sources of information needed throughout 
the intelligence and law enforcement communities to complete the national security and 
defense mission while sharing information and intelligence information throughout the 
FBI and with its participating national security partners. 
B. DESCRIPTION OF THE RIMS SYSTEM 
The RIMS code aids in cataloguing the huge amounts of information the FBI 
collects on a daily basis and in the rapid retrieval of information.  The RIMS metadata 
system is similar to a Vehicle Identification Number (VIN).  It should be no less than 10 
digits and as much as 13 digits and is alpha-numeric.  When a document is created, the 
author places the RIMS code in the Administrative section of the document.  Wrong 
codes or typographical errors can happen but when found, the errors can be quickly 
corrected by an edit to the document.  Even after the document is in ACS, if an error is 
found in the RIMS code, the document can be removed from the system and re-entered 
with the adjusted RIMS code. 
The first five characters alone should immediately determine the type 
(counterintelligence, counterterrorism, or criminal) of intelligence or investigation you 
are looking at.  If “RQPG1” is written, automatically the document contents pertain to a 
Pittsburgh counterintelligence matter.  If “RQPG2” is written, it is automatically known 
 41
that this document is counterterrorism-related.  If you want to know if the document 
pertains to international terrorism (INTERR) or domestic terrorism (DOMTERR), simply 
look at the Alpha Terrorism character to determine if it is INTERR or DOMTERR.  
“RQPG3” designates the document to either a non-National Security Program matter or a 
DOMTERR “Lone-wolf” individual.  The beauty of the RIMS code is that, if coded 
correctly, the reader can look at the code and determine what type of information is 
covered in the document before even reading it.  This would allow for streamlining of 
analysis and quick retrieval of specific documents pertaining to specific intelligence. 
 
The following are the digit definitions of the code: 
 
RQ: Short form for “Requirements” (There are no words that 
begin with “RQ” which would automatically narrow the 
search perimeters for documents housing “RQ” within the 
text of the document.)  
Two-digit alpha code for each FBI field office (i.e., PG for 
Pittsburgh.  It should be noted, this section could be 
changed to state codes such as “CA” for California, which 
would be beneficial to a national type tagging code.) 
 
TYPE: One-digit numeric code.  The “Type” denoting a State, 
Group, Individual or Other (i.e., Business) 
1 Counterintelligence Interest Only 
2 Counterterrorism (International and Domestic     Groups) 
3 Criminal (Non-National Security Program) and “Lone-
wolf” types in Domestic Terrorism cases  
 
TOPIC: One-digit alpha code for the various intelligence collection 
initiatives within the U.S. government.  (The documents 
used to create the code used in the FBI system are 
classified.) 
 
ALPHA TERRORISM One-digit alpha code for the FBI’s Classification Code for 
International Terrorism matters and Specific Domestic 
Terrorism entities.  If not a terrorism matter, a zero (“0”) is 
placed here as a space holder. 
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ACTIVITY  One-digit numeric code for groupings of activities based 
upon a joint FBI-DHS Initiative, “TerroristThreats to the US 
Homeland, Reporting Guide.” (Some examples are: 
Personnel/Organization Information, Capabilities, 
Operations, or Criminal Activities) 
    
MAIN INDICATOR One-digit alpha code for specific types of sub-activities 
under each main identified activity. (Some examples are 
Leadership activities, Logistics/Infrastructure activities, 
Targeting, or Illegal Acts within the U.S.)  This code is 
based upon a joint FBI-DHS Initiative, “Terrorist Threats 
to the US Homeland, Reporting Guide.” 
 
SPECIFIC INDICATOR One-digit alpha code for detailed activities under the main 
indicator sub-activities to further identify the activity. (If no 
specific indicator is given, a zero “0” is placed here to keep 
the space. Some examples are Cyber, Finances, and 
Mobility)  This code is based upon a joint FBI-DHS 
Initiative, “Terrorist Threats to the US Homeland, 
Reporting Guide.” 
 
SPECIFIC CODES This is an optional expansion of the RIMS ten-digit 
identified by a three-digit alpha or numeric code. Specific 
countries/states, terrorist groups, Criminal Crime Problem 
Indicator Codes, and Specific Cyber crimes are used and 
based upon a variety of government documents. 
 
Since RIMS is a field office initiative, no approved reference documents are 
available to define RIMS.  Intra-office documents were created by the field office trainers 
for use in RIMS training to field personnel, other field offices, and FBI Headquarters.  
The training document is classified due to the RIMS code identification markers. During 
all training of RIMS, the following information was provided for guidance and 
explanation of the FBI’s RIMS code:   
The beginning two-alpha designators, “RQ” stand for Requirements.  In looking 
at large English language dictionaries, no words start with the two letters “RQ.”  In initial 
text word searches on ACS or other FBI databases, only communications with “RQ” 
surfaced or on occasion some misspelled words had the “RQ” letters within the 
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communication.  The standard use of “RQ” begins all RIMS tagging code and quickly 
identifies all documents with the two alpha designations. 
The next two alpha designations are FBI two digit division codes.  There are 56 
field offices within the FBI, each with a two digit division code.  Within U.S. intelligence 
and law enforcement national security communities, these codes are known, accepted, 
and identifies when information or intelligence arrives from the FBI.  Each FBI document 
must have identifying case file numbers which use the two digit division code.  The 
standard use of the two digit FBI division code as the third and fourth space holder within 
the RIMS tagging code identifies all documents originating from the division.  If 
additional information is needed or similar occurrences are witnessed in other divisions, 
coordination can quickly occur between the divisions which “connects the dots” in 
analysis through the RIMS code.  For example, up to the events involving the terrorist 
acts on September 11, if the RIMS code was in use, all divisions who noted unusual 
events involving Middle Easterners and aircraft flight schools throughout the country 
would have been able to place the specific RIMS code on their communications.  
Strategic analysts both at the field or headquarters level may have caught the similarities 
and possibly alerted officials of unusual activity involving a finite group of individuals.  
Armed with that information, agents could have been dispatched to interview the school 
officials or even the flight school candidates, thus possibly revealing the September 11th 
plot.  Although we will never know if the use of the RIMS code could have alerted U.S. 
officials to the September 11 plot, the possibility exists that this small measure of 
information sharing and collaboration and the subsequent directed actions by agents 
and/or analysts could have saved countless lives on September 11, 2001. 
The fifth place marker is a numeric number, one through three which aids in the 
identification of programs.  Type “1” (State) should only be used in counterintelligence 
cases.  Type “2” (Group) should only be used in international terrorism cases, as well as 
domestic terrorism cases involving a group.  Type “3” should only be used in “lone-wolf” 
type domestic terrorism cases and non-National Security program cases (i.e., criminal and 
cyber).  
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The sixth place marker is an alpha marker and originated with classified U.S. 
government documents which pertain to intelligence collection initiatives. Besides the 
use of the classified documents, additional alpha designators have been added to this 
section to identify issue specific items such as international finance, weapons of mass 
destruction, or other criminal programs such as cyber, violent crimes, white collar crimes 
or drugs. 
The seventh designator signifies the FBI’s terrorism investigative alpha 
classification.  It is classified and includes states and groups within the international and 
domestic terrorism realm.  A similar document, on the Department of State website, lists 
all foreign terrorist organizations. 
Specific information identification and tagging comes with the eighth, ninth, and 
tenth place designators.  The three markers tell the reader exactly what information or 
intelligence has been collected.  Of course, perception and classification of information is 
a subjective matter, but the clear groupings of information can lead users in the right 
direction in amassing information from a variety of areas. 
The “Activity,” “Main Indicator,” and the “Specific Indicator” designators 
originated from a review of an UNCLASSIFIED/FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY document 
entitled, “Terrorist Threats to the U.S. Homeland Reporting Guide” (TTRG).  This 
document was jointly produced by the FBI and the Department of Homeland Security.  
The purpose of this document was to “leverage the vast information collection and 
reporting resources of our state, local and tribal law enforcement partners, as well as 
other first responder partners, in recognizing activities and conditions that my be 
indicative of terrorist activity.”47  The report notes “state and local organizations are on 
the front line in the war against terror and therefore have a critical role as primary sources 
of information.  Timely and relevant information from the “front lines” is critical to the 
identification of terrorists and their supporters, development of insights into their plans 
and intentions, and subsequent disruption of their operations.”48  This guide can be found 
                                                 
47 Terrorist Threat to the US Homeland Reporting Guide, October 21, 2004. 3. 
48 Ibid., 3. 
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on LEO at http://www.leo.gov and by clicking on the TTRG tab on the following 
Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN)/ Joint Regional Exchange System 
(JRIES) portals: 
  — Law Enforcement (LE):  https://jries.dhs.gov 
  — Combating Terrorism (CT):  https://ct.jties.dhs.gov 
  — Emergency Operations Center (EOC): https://eoc.jries.dhs.gov 
 
The “Activity” numeric designator is a grouping of four main activities as noted 
in the TTRG as they relate to terrorism activities.  If the activity noted is not terrorism-
related, then a zero, “0” is placed in the eighth spot to hold the place. 
The “Main Indicator,” the ninth spot, is an alpha designation and identifies 
specific types of sub activities under each main identified activity (eighth spot).  The 
information here would reveal leadership or membership information or logistic or 
financing information to name a few indicators. 
The final mandatory RIMS identifier, the tenth spot, is also an alpha designator 
and provides specific information pertaining to the ninth indicator.  At this time, this 
alpha code specifically deals with logistics and infrastructure indicators or specific types 
of attacks (i.e., Cyber, CBRNE, or non-CBRNE).  If no specific indicator is noted for this 
designation, a zero, “0” is placed in the tenth spot to hold the place and complete the 
RIMS code with ten digits. 
The optional three designators are three-digit numeric codes which expand the 
RIMS code to identify specific countries or states, terror groups, the FBI Criminal Crime 
Problem Indicator (CPI) Codes, and Cyber crimes.  These specific codes were created 
from various documents to include the United Nations Country Code List, the U.S. 
Department of State List of Identified Foreign Terrorist Organizations, the FBI’s 
Domestic Terrorism Operational Unit’s List of major Domestic Terrorism investigations, 
the FBI’s FY 2005 CPI Code list, and a list of FBI Cyber violations. 
It should be noted; more than one RIMS code can be used on communications to 
designate the crossover of intelligence and information into more than one program or 
areas. 
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Below are examples of the RIMS code in use: 
 
EXAMPLE:  Source reporting revealed Main Street Gang leader, John Smith, 123 Main 
Street, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania was involved in the murder of a rival gang member, John 
Brown of the 10th Street Gang, over drug trafficking into the Pittsburgh area from 
Canada. 
 
RIMS Code: RQPG3X01A0-CAN - Requirement (RQ) from Pittsburgh (PG) concerning 
an individual (3) involved in violent crimes (X).  Specific information pertains to the 
individual’s participation in an organization (1) and denotes he is a leader (A) in the 
organization.  Information possibly involves Canadian interests (CAN). (Note:  Two 




RIMS Code:  RQPG3O01A0-CAN - Requirement (RQ) from Pittsburgh (PG) concerning 
an individual (3) involved in drugs (O).  Specific information pertains to the individual’s 
participation in an organization (1) and denotes he is a leader (A) in the organization.  




RIMS Code: RQPG3O01A0-533 - Requirement (RQ) from Pittsburgh (PG) concerning 
an individual (3) involved in drug (O).  Specific information pertains to the individual’s 
participation in an organization (1) and denotes he is a leader (A) in the organization.  
Information possibly involves drug trafficking (533 – FBI CPI code). 
 
The simple criminal example above shows the ability of RIMS to be used across 
programs and to unite programs where in the past some information could be lost or not 
noted as important.  Simplicity is the key — breaking down the various factors into 
succinct facts.  If several communications or documents appear within the RIMS coding 
system from several offices with similar information such as the use of Canada for drug 
trafficking into the U.S. then border offices of the FBI along with other federal, state, 
local, and tribal law enforcement communities can be notified along with the 
commencement of liaison with the Canadian government concerning an sudden increase 
in drug trafficking between the two countries. (Note: It is highly important that the RIMS 
code be thoughtfully placed on the documents by in investigators or analysts in order to 
build the catalog of information and intelligence to make the connections and “connect 
the dots.” 
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EXAMPLE:  Source reporting indicates a Seattle group calling themselves the Animal 
Liberation Front (ALF) completed a computer intrusion which gained them the names 
and addresses of stockholders in a small but flourishing pharmaceutical company known 
to use animals for testing purposes.   
 
RIMS Code:  RQSE2SU3A0 - Requirement (RQ) from Seattle (SE) concerning a group 
(2) involved in terrorism (S), who promote animal rights (U).  Specific activity of the 
group was an operation (3) to obtain the names and addresses of stockholders (A – 





RIMS Code:  RQSE2SU3BC - Requirement (RQ) from Seattle (SE) concerning a group 
(2) involved in terrorism (S), who promote animal rights (U).  Specific activity of the 





RIMS Code: RQSE2SU3A0-672 - Requirement (RQ) from Seattle (SE) concerning a 
group (2) involved in terrorism (S), who promote animal rights (U).  Specific activity of 
the group was an operation (3) to obtain the names and addresses of stockholders (A – 
Objectives of Attack). The cyber (600 series designation) specialty involves the Public 
Health and Healthcare Industry.  (Note:  One place holder of zero where used here in the 
tenth position) 
Additional RIMS codes can be created based upon the simple information 
provided above and the thoroughness of the investigator or analyst.  The RIMS code here 
is showing that a domestic terrorist group is using cyber crimes in their activities which 
will affect an infrastructure group critical to the welfare of America.  By crossing 
programs and activities we can connect the vast amount of daily intelligence that arrives 
within the FBI and provide strategic value to the U.S. intelligence and law enforcement 
communities along with U.S. policymakers. 
As seen above, the RIMS code can be generated by an analyst or investigator 
when initially creating a document for the FBI based upon active investigative work or 
completed analysis.  The RIMS code is the raw form of intelligence which when 
combined during a specific RIMS search, could yield previously unknown links, 
anomalies, or patterns for further investigation or research/analysis. 
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C. FBI PERSONNEL MAKE USE OF RIMS  
Since January 2006, FBI personnel in the Pittsburgh FBI Field Division used 
RIMS on a trial basis with support from the division’s executive management.  Searches 
conducted by FBI personnel using the RIMS metadata code were inherently quicker with 
a higher degree of accuracy due to the exact nature of the RIMS code.  A single RIMS 
search would return all relevant documents on a specific subject.  Without RIMS, an 
analyst or investigator would randomly search various databases on topical subjects using 
word phrases and common spellings.  One specific RIMS code when entered into search 
criteria of any FBI computer would yield, in a matter of seconds, all documents which 
held the specific RIMS code. No questionable documents would be retrieved and any 
misspelled or non-standard words would not be overlooked.  Only information requested 
that matched the code was provided, eliminating extraneous information caused by poor 
indexing or misspelled names. Information relevance and accuracy was improved.  RIMS 
would reduce the probability that a user of ACS would not retrieve vital information in a 
timely manner for analysis and making that link to a possible terrorist threat.  This 
innovative system is cost effective, having minimal impact on the FBI’s current 
information technology structure.  There are zero new equipment costs to the FBI, and 
the system uses existing alpha and numeric codes familiar within the USIC and the U.S. 
government.  Additionally, since there are no formal cataloguing, metadata, or retrieval 
methods approved within the FBI, this cataloguing and retrieval system was an 
immediate improvement to current FBI information tagging methods.   
In the fall of 2005, the FBI embarked on a Domain Management Initiative (DMI) 
wherein five field offices were provided authority by FBIHQ to find innovative methods 
or systems to determine the offices’ domain using new technology methods to include 
“thinking outside the box.”  On January 1, 2006, the RIMS code was initiated on all 
communications containing intelligence information within the Pittsburgh Field Office of 
the FBI.  On February 16, 2006, the RIMS system was briefed to the four other FBI field 
offices:  San Francisco, Miami, Charlotte, and Little Rock.  Training by Pittsburgh 
personnel was provided the field offices.  Additionally, FBI Headquarter personnel from 
the Directorate of Intelligence were also provided a briefing and training on the RIMS 
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code.  The four field offices agreed to test the RIMS codes on future communications.  
Members from FBI Headquarters, Directorate of Intelligence, received the RIMS code 
positively.  
D. WHY THE NEED FOR RIMS? 
The FBI is not alone within the realm of national security and defense.  Numerous 
other agencies, organizations, groups and individuals contribute to the security of the 
U.S.  The FBI’s role in Homeland Security, as mentioned previously, is the 
prevention/investigation of terrorist acts.  As the lead federal law enforcement agency for 
all domestic terrorism investigations, the FBI must gather, analyze, and share intelligence 
on terrorists, terrorist activities, and terrorist groups with government leaders, intelligence 
community, and national/international law enforcement entities.  Currently, the FBI does 
not have the means, other than liaison efforts and joint participation in the NJTTF, JTTFs 
and Regional Fusion Centers, to have total transparency with its national security partners 
concerning information sharing and collaboration.  This simple information tagging 
system, RIMS, provides a structured and standardized approach to initially share 
information throughout the FBI and with its participating national security partners.  
Finally, this system can be expanded to cover the identification, cataloging and retrieving 
of non-national security information which would benefit other federal, state, local and 
tribal law enforcement and intelligence communities in criminal, cyber-based, or 
intelligence investigations. 
E. RIMS AS A CORPORATE PROJECT? 
Since January 1, 2006, the Pittsburgh Division used RIMS (called RICS) on all 
intelligence communications.  Success was measured on how quickly information and 
intelligence could be recalled by agents and analysts and the ease of learning the RIMS 
system.  Investigators, analysts, and professional support were trained to use RIMS in a 
minimal time period (less than one day).  This coding system was cost effective, having 
minimal impact on the FBI’s current information technology structure.  There were 
minimal new equipment costs to the FBI, and the system uses existing codes familiar 
within the USIC and the U.S. government.  Pittsburgh Executive Management was 
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supportive of the coding system and saw the system as an improvement on the way the 
FBI and Pittsburgh managed intelligence.   
An informal discussion/focus group was created in Pittsburgh which consisted of 
investigators, analysts, and professional support personnel who had worked with and 
been trained on the RIMS coding system since January 2006.  This group consisted of 
fifteen Intelligence Analysts, six Special Agents, three Supervisory Special Agents, and 
two professional support personnel who were responsible for FBI files.  The length in 
government service ranged from over twenty five years to two years.  Both men and 
women were in the discussion group with age ranges from the mid 20s through mid 50s.  
All personnel worked within the FBI’s Intelligence Program (Counterterrorism, 
Counterintelligence, and Field Intelligence Group personnel) for more than two years.  
All but one had completed advanced education degrees or certificates after high school.   
The Pittsburgh Division’s Field Intelligence Group Manager, Supervisory Special 
Agent Erin M. Beckman, shepherded the discussion group, asking the questions below.    
The group’s results from December 7, 2006, were forwarded to FBI Headquarters for 
review. 
• Is the name (“RICS” by the field office) adequate to describe the system? 
• How much training is necessary to personnel for understanding of the system? 
• Should the system be expanded to more than 10-13 characters? If so, why? 
• Describe the ease or difficulty to use the system? 
• What errors would occur when using the system? 
• When tagging information, does this aid the agent or analyst in focusing efforts on 
what is actually being collected? 
• Does this system aid agents or analysts in understanding the U.S. Intelligence 
Community priorities and the FBI priorities? 
• What other uses is there for this system? 
• Who would benefit from the use of this system? 
• Any hidden costs in the use of this system that have surfaced since using the 
system? 
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• How can this system be marketed to FBI Headquarters as a possible near term 
solution to information management? 
When discussed within the group49, all commented that it was easy to use (takes 
very little thought once trained).  The group described the system as a tool that refers 
back to the Intelligence Community priorities.  By tagging information with RIMS codes 
at the outset (preparation of the document), the information can be retrieved with relative 
ease.  They added the retrieval can be in a very broad sense (if you only is the first five or 
six characters of a RIMS code as a search term), down to the retrieval of extremely 
specific information (if you use the entire expanse of characters, including the country or 
terrorist group specific, 11-13 characters).   
The group further added that RIMS can also be searched in ACS and other FBI 
databases.  Results of retrieved information using RIMS versus current accepted search 
styles with paper file reviews and ACS record checks showed RIMS to be physically 
effortless (no pulling files) and less time consuming for RIMS users.  Knowing the 
information needed, creating the RIMS code(s) and typing it/them into ACS and other 
FBI databases, took a small amount of time.  The results from the existing enterprise 
architecture structure within the FBI IT system were presented in seconds as opposed to 
paper file reviews and numerous (exact) word searches which could take hours.  The 
more exact the RIMS code identification, the more specific the search results which 
amounted to increased analytical output through less time completing the accepted search 
styles with paper file reviews and ACS record checks.  Additionally, linkages (source 
reporting from various programs) of reporting were captured where in the past, different 
programs (criminal versus intelligence or terrorism) did not compare similar information. 
Tagging the information also forced the investigators and analysts to think about 
what they are actually collecting, investigating, and analyzing.  In so doing, the group 
                                                 
49  Discussion Group results from December 7, 2006, were forwarded to FBI Headquarters for review.  
It should be noted, other field divisions (Miami) have implemented information tagging systems of a 
similar nature.  FBI Headquarters is currently developing a system, called “iMark,” with the design based 
upon the RIMS tagging system.  Further development by FBI Headquarters is pending with a possible 
release in 2007. 
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began to think about whether their information was being collected, investigated, or 
analyzed in accordance with the Intelligence Community priorities. 
RIMS was also useful to the analysts when drafting Intelligence Assessments: one 
can search in both broad and limited fashions regarding the topic at hand rather than 
attempt to use keyword database searches.  An example given was when preparing a 
division counterintelligence threat assessment; the analyst could use RIMS to search the 
division’s information for operatives associated with their countries of interest.  With a 
broader search perspective, the analyst could look at operatives across all countries 
present within the division and conduct a trend analysis based on the findings.  Such 
information would be much more difficult to extract if the analyst was conducting 
keyword searches in ACS etc.  For the same reasons, RIMS could benefit FBI 
Headquarters and the researching of information for strategic analyses. 
The group felt RIMS also has value with respect to collection management (i.e., 
assigning RIMS codes to requirement sets.) 
The bottom line, according to the FBI discussion group, is implementation across 
FBI field offices and FBI Headquarters could be quick.  The RIMS string itself is not 
complicated and it costs nothing.  As long as it is standardized and users are properly 
trained in how to code the documents, RIMS could be very effective and time-saving.  
The group did note that to get a better idea as to its practicality and usefulness, RIMS 
could be implemented in selected offices (pilot project) for a six-month period. 
F. BENEFITS AND POTENTIAL PROBLEMS WITH RIMS 
Zalmai Azmi, Chief Information Officer (CIO) for the FBI and personnel within 
the Office of the CIO have a mission50 to provide leadership, policy guidance and 
strategic direction for the FBI’s information technology enterprise, to include developing 
the FBI's IT strategic plan and operating budget; developing and maintaining the FBI's  
 
 
                                                 
50 Information pertaining to the FBI’s Office of the Chief Information Officer and his mission 
statement and goals can be found at http://www.fbi.gov/hq/ocio/mgo.htm (Accessed December 3, 2006). 
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technology assets; and providing technical direction for the reengineering of FBI business 
processes. In order to accomplish the FBI CIO’s mission, the following goals and 
objectives were established: 
• Actively support the priorities of the FBI. 
• Foster and enrich employee productivity and morale. 
• Identify and strengthen our core competencies. 
• Build and strengthen the key processes that will enable us to successfully 
fulfill our mission. 
• Seek out and leverage external feedback to make changes needed in our 
organization (i.e., Inspection Findings, customer satisfaction surveys etc.). 
• Be responsive to customers (i.e., Inspections Findings, requests for work etc.). 
• Aggressively migrate to standard configurations and products. 
• Promote the Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) program, Employee 
Assistance Program (EAP) and the Upward Mobility (UM) program. 
 
The FBI is involved in information acquisition and the workflow of information 
management—how information is acquired, who must act on it, how information of all 
types flows within the FBI, how it must be processed and analyzed, and what types of 
inferences must be drawn.  For information-intensive missions such as criminal 
investigation and counterterrorism, modern IT and its proper design and exploitation are 
critical contributors to truly effective processes.  Data must be organized and managed in 
a way to promote the effectiveness of FBI agents and intelligence analysts. Access 
capabilities required for intelligence analysis in order to determine possible events in the 
future are crucial to the FBI as it continues to build a viable domestic intelligence agency 
and supports the U.S. intelligence and law enforcement communities. 
In multiple Congressional testimonies51 before and after 9/11, the director of the 
FBI, along with other senior FBI executives, acknowledged the need to replace the 
established FBI information technology (IT) enterprise framework which stove-piped 
                                                 
51 FBI Director Robert S. Mueller III, Statement before the Senate Appropriations Committee, 
Subcommittee on the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies,  
March 23, 2004, and Testimony of Bob E. Dies, Assistant Director, Information Resources Division, FBI, 
Before the Senate Judiciary Committee July 18, 2001, titled “Information Technology and the FBI.” 
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investigative applications. An improved approach to collect and manage FBI case and 
investigative information was needed.  Additionally, the new system must support the 
operational mission of the FBI by enhancing its information management capabilities. 
The collection, dissemination, and availability of data and investigative tasking across the 
entire organization will enable the assembly and management of case information for 
intelligence and investigative activities and will support rapid and effective information 
sharing among FBI personnel and with authorized external agencies. 
Currently, there is no central search platform to gather information or data mine 
within a genre of information.  Training on data mining and searching the various 
databases is minimal.  Some FBI field offices have taken formative steps to establish 
structured, relational databases to facilitate robust case management and intelligence 
support to operations.  These offices have elected to use a commercially available, off-
the-shelf software analytical application called iBase, which is produced by i2 INC.  In 
addition, several operational units at FBI Headquarters have adopted similar approaches 
using structured, relational database packages.  Ultimately, the FBI must establish an 
enterprise-wide standardized approach for classifying investigative information into a 
structured, relational database environment to benefit fully from this technology.  One 
approach would be the use of the RIMS code in order to facilitate case management and 
process intelligence and share information with approved individuals.  
Successful government leaders realize that a key part of their success is leaving a 
powerful and positive mark through their work.  These actions have a profound effect on 
individuals and society.  The FBI is charged with proactively investigating and 
prosecuting crimes against America to include terrorism along with protecting America 
from those who would harm America’s way of life.  An important part of the FBI’s 
success is linked to the powerful and positive impact that the FBI has in their 
communities (U.S. intelligence and law enforcement communities along with the 
American public).  Therefore, an FBI coding system must be designed to capture, 
catalogue, and retrieve FBI intelligence information for sharing within the U.S. 
intelligence and law enforcement communities.  The use of the coding system will better 
capture, catalogue, and retrieve information at a higher success rate and more quickly 
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within the FBI’s current databases.  The use of this system is cost effective and will have 
minimal impact on the FBI’s current IT structure and not radically effect the FBI’s future 
IT structure, SENTINEL.  The use of the RIMS coding system can be adapted for use by 
other U.S. intelligence and law enforcement communities for commonality and 
uniformity in retrieval, cataloguing, and collecting of intelligence information.  The use 
of this system can be manipulated into a non-classified code for utilization by state, local, 
and tribal law enforcement and intelligence entities.  Finally, the use of the coding system 
within the intelligence community will consolidate and integrate information and 
intelligence and reduce delays in detecting and retrieving pertinent intelligence obtained 
and shared across the intelligence community.  
G. IMPLEMENTATION PLAN FOR RIMS 
1. Blue Ocean Strategy and the Strategy Canvas52 
Blue Ocean Strategy is a book that provides a blueprint on how to create 
uncontested corporate market space ripe for growth.  Such strategic moves create 
powerful leaps in value for the firm and its buyers, rendering rivals obsolete and 
unleashing new demand.  If we look at the FBI as a corporation, the creation and use of 
the RIMS coding system provides the FBI with a new market which has unlimited 
profitable growth in security of its citizens, increased value in the FBI’s ability to manage 
intelligence and in turn collaborate and share intelligence which in the end will render 
terrorists and criminals ineffective in the U.S.   
As stated by the authors of the Blue Ocean Strategy, “the strategy canvas is both a 
diagnostic and an action framework for building a blue ocean strategy.”53  It captures the 
current state of the program or activity under scrutiny and allows for the understanding 
where the current investment is in products, services, delivery, and what customers 
receive from the existing activity or program.  The canvas enables companies to see the 
future in the present. 
                                                 
52 W. Chan Kim & Renee Maugorgne, Blue Ocean Strategy (Boston, Massachusetts, Harvard 
Business School Press, 2005). 
53 Kim & Maugorgne, Blue Ocean Strategy, 25.  
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In the case of information sharing by the FBI internally and with the U.S. 
intelligence and law enforcement communities, an FBI information coding system must 
be designed to capture, catalogue, and retrieve FBI intelligence information for sharing.  
From previous testing, it is expected this system will detect and retrieve pertinent 
intelligence obtained by the FBI. This proposed system will improve the FBI’s ability to 
share information within the FBI and with members of the U.S. intelligence and law 
enforcement communities and as warranted, with state, local, and tribal entities who aid 
in the defense of America.  There are eight principal factors that the law enforcement and 
intelligence communities compete on and invest in.  They are: 
• Source information and intelligence (A) 
• Information and intelligence from investigations and operations (B) 
• Information and intelligence gained from domestic liaison efforts (C) 
• Information and intelligence gained from foreign liaison efforts (D) 
• Information Technology Systems and Equipment (E) 
• Databases and Software Capabilities (F) 
• Information and intelligence gained within accepted federal, state, and local 
regulations, laws, and accepted practices (G) 
• Information and intelligence gained from U.S. intelligence and law 
enforcement communities along with the public through training and 
experiences (H) 
 
The following chart captures the above list of factors within the federal, state, and 
local/tribal sectors, along with the offering level that the sectors receive across the eight 









Table 1.   Strategy Factors—Competition of Eight Principal Factors.  
KEY 
FACTORS 
FEDERAL LEVEL STATE LEVEL LOCAL/TRIBAL LEVEL 
A High High High 
B High High High 
C High Medium Medium 
D High Low Low 
E High Medium Low 
F High Medium Low 
G High High High 
H High High High 
 
The above chart shows federal entities investing and supporting all the key factors 
within the information-sharing/intelligence initiative in order to maximize the federal 
government’s response to national security.  The state and local/tribal levels of support 
and investment are lower due to current organizational hurdles that need to be overcome 
in order to execute a new system.  The new coding system could provide information 
sharing and “connecting the dots.” This would immediately allow for a visible increase in 
safety and the lowering crime rates and violence.   
In the chart form below, the same information is portrayed.  An extreme 
discrepancy is shown concerning IT matters and liaison which with the implementation 









Table 2.   Strategy Canvas—Competition of Eight Principal Factors. 
 
 
2. Four Action Framework54 
The second analytic underlying Blue Ocean is the four actions framework.  There 
are four key questions that challenge communities’ strategic logic and business model.  
They are: 
• Which factors should be reduced well below the industry’s standard? 
• Which factors should be created that the industry has never offered? 
• Which of the factors that the industry takes for granted should be eliminated? 
• Which factors should be raised well above the industry’s standard? 
                                                 


























The following lists provide answers to the above four questions in regards to a 
coding system design to capture, catalogue, and retrieve intelligence information for 
sharing within the U.S. intelligence and law enforcement communities: 
 










Single database for national intelligence 
tagging 
Ease in use 
Rules/Regulations mandate cooperation 
Electronic data interchange 
Speed and Accuracy in use 
Security of information 
ELIMINATION 
Source competition 
Investigative and Operational competition 
Personnel competition (positions) 
 
RAISE 
Domestic Liaison Cooperation 
(Relationship Management) 
Foreign Liaison Cooperation (Relationship 
Management) 
Speed of sharing information/intelligence 
Compatibility of IT systems and databases 
 
 
When the four actions framework is applied to the strategy canvas, a new look is 
revealed at old accepted practices.  In the case of information-sharing initiatives within 
the FBI and the U.S. government, new alternatives and new customers can be analyzed 
and new factors created within the information-sharing initiative — ease of use, speed of 
sharing information, compatibility of IT systems and databases, and liaison cooperation.  
This results in a broad cross section appeal within all levels of the FBI and the U.S. 
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government in the capturing, cataloguing, and retrieving of intelligence information for 
sharing within all the U.S. intelligence and law enforcement communities. 
3. Value Curve Comparison 
According the authors of the Blue Ocean Strategy, the value curve is a basic 
component of the strategy canvas and “is a graphic depiction of a company’s relative 
performance across its industry’s factors of competition.”55  As mentioned earlier, the 
strategy canvas enables companies to see the future in the present.  Embedded in the 
value curves of an industry is a wealth of strategic knowledge on the current status and 
future of a business.56 
The value curve of the FBI’s coding system differs distinctively from those of its 
competitors in the strategy canvas.  The FBI coding system has focus which can be seen 
at once.  The system emphasizes speed, interoperability, and feasibility.  By focusing in 
this way, the FBI’s coding system is cost effective and an immediate enhancement to 
current FBI retrieval methods.  The system will have minimal impact on the FBI’s 
current information technology structure, have zero new equipment costs to the FBI, and 
uses existing alpha and numeric codes familiar within the U.S. intelligence and law 
enforcement communities. 
Post 9/11, the FBI’s strategy for information sharing was formed reactively as the 
FBI tried to keep up with other agencies and their information-sharing practices.  In order 
for the value curve for the blue ocean strategists to diverge from the reactive strategists, 
the four action framework analytic must be applied – eliminating, reducing, raising, and 
creating.  Using this framework would differentiate the FBI’s strategy from the other 
agencies and their practices.  For example, the FBI’s coding system would pioneer the 
use of a single database for national intelligence tagging; previously, the government’s 
various intelligence and law enforcement communities operated under separate and 
distinctive databases with little interoperability and minimal information sharing across 
agencies. 
                                                 
55 Kim & Maugorgne, Blue Ocean Strategy, 27. 
56 Ibid., 41. 
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A good strategy has a clear-cut and compelling tagline. It delivers a clear message 
but also advertises truthfulness.  The FBI’s coding system has new factors such as a 
single database for national intelligence tagging, ease in use, electronic data interchange, 
and speed and accuracy in use.  Whether the FBI can attain sustained consolidation and 
integration of information through a new coding system depends largely upon whether 
the FBI can continuously stay in the forefront during future rounds of blue ocean 
creation.  Lasting excellence is scarcely achievable for any company or agency over the 
long run.  However, the FBI is a powerful agency that is capable of reinventing itself by 
repeatedly creating new initiatives and projects to meet the U.S. intelligence and law 
enforcement communities along with the American public’s needs.   
H. OVERCOMING KEY ORGANIZATIONAL HURDLES 
According to the authors of the blue ocean strategy, “once a company has 
developed a blue ocean strategy with a profitable business model, it must execute it.”57  
The challenge of such execution exists and companies can have a tough time translating 
thought into action.  “Blue ocean strategy represents a significant departure from the 
status quo.”58  There are four hurdles that must be faced when diverging from the status 
quo.  “One is cognitive: waking employees up to the need for a strategic shift.”59  The 
second hurdle is limited resources.  The third hurdle is motivation. “How do you motivate 
key players to move fast and tenaciously to carry out a break from the status quo.  That 
will take years and managers don’t have that kind of time.”60 The final hurdle is politics.  
To make blue ocean strategy succeed, the company must overcome these key 
organizational hurdles.  To achieve this effectively, “companies must abandon perceived 
wisdom of effecting change.  Conventional wisdom asserts that the greater the change, 
the greater the resources and time you will need to bring about results.”61  
 
                                                 
57 Kim & Maugorgne, Blue Ocean Strategy, 147. 
58 Ibid.  
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid., 148. 
61 Ibid.  
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I. IMPLICATIONS OF A BLUE OCEAN STRATEGY EXECUTION 
The FBI must overcome key organizational hurdles such as the departure from the 
status quo.  The motivation by key FBI personnel to move forward to change the status 
quo is paramount to make this system operational. FBI employees also need to 
understand the need for a strategic shift and more or less agree on the contours of the new 
strategy.    Second, the FBI has limited resources.  Instead of focusing on getting more 
resources, the FBI should concentrate on multiplying the value of the resources the FBI 
has.   Finally, politics affect any new initiative.  Organizational politics is an inescapable 
reality of government work. Powerful vested interests within the FBI will resist the 
impending changes and will fight to protect their positions.  Their resistance can damage 
and even derail a strategy execution process such as a new coding system and/or search 
platform within the FBI. 
For success in this new FBI strategy62 to occur, the FBI must shift customers’ 
(U.S. intelligence and law enforcement communities) perception of the FBI and the FBI’s 
ability to perform this IT function.  The FBI must broaden information sharing among 
U.S. intelligence and law enforcement communities. In hand, there must be an increase in 
the communities’ confidence in the FBI’s IT system.  The FBI must employ and train 
knowledgeable people and provide convenient access and superior service to its 
customers.  Additionally, the FBI must build strategic information and develop strategic 
skills through the creation of innovative products, focused resources and improved 
employee effectiveness.  Finally, the FBI must understand their customers and work in 
partnership with them to protect the American public and way of life. 
Successful government leaders realize that a key part of their success is leaving a 
powerful and positive mark through their work.  These actions have a profound effect on 
individuals and society.  The FBI is charged with proactively investigating and 
prosecuting crimes against America to include terrorism, along with protecting America 
from those who would harm America’s way of life.  An important part of the FBI’s 
success is linked to the powerful and positive impact that the FBI has in its communities 
                                                 
62 Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Strategic Plan 2004-2009, FBI Public Website. 
http://www.fbi.gov/publications/strategicplan/stategicplantext.htm#it (Accessed January 15, 2007). 
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(U.S. intelligence and law enforcement communities, along with the American public).  
Therefore, an FBI coding system must be designed to capture, catalogue, and retrieve FBI 
intelligence information for sharing within the U.S. intelligence and law enforcement 
communities.  The use of the coding system will better capture, catalogue, and retrieve 
information at a higher success rate and more quickly within the FBI’s current databases, 
using current FBI IT.  The use of this system is cost effective and will have minimal 
impact on the FBI’s current IT structure and not radically effect the FBI’s future 
Information Technology structure, SENTINEL.  The use of the coding system can be 
adapted for use by other U.S. intelligence and law enforcement communities for 
commonality and uniformity in retrieval, cataloguing, and collecting of intelligence 
information.  The use of this system can be manipulated into a non-classified code for 
utilization by state, local, and tribal law enforcement and intelligence entities.  Finally, 
the use of the coding system within the intelligence community will consolidate and 
integrate information and intelligence and reduce delays in detecting and retrieving 
pertinent intelligence obtained and shared within the intelligence community.  
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VIII. SUMMARY 
This thesis set out to determine if the RIMS metadata could be developed and 
implemented in the FBI in order to have a central search platform for use by FBI analysts 
or investigators to gather or data mine existing information in furtherance of the FBI’s 
Priorities.  A secondary effect would include whether the RIMS code would be an 
effective and efficient method to capture, catalogue and retrieve intelligence information 
within the FBI.  Validation of this system occurred through actual field use, using the 
code in specific searches versus the current accepted search styles with paper file reviews 
and ACS record checks.  Results from a RIMS user discussion group solicited comments 
and suggestions that were in turn forwarded to FBI Headquarters.  Additionally, other 
FBI field divisions implemented similar information tagging systems within their own 
divisions for a cost-effective and immediate remedy to ensuring FBI information is 
catalogued and analyzed in a more thorough manner.  FBI Headquarters is currently 
developing a system, called “iMark,” with the design based upon the RIMS tagging 
system.  Further development by FBI Headquarters is pending with a possible release to 
the field divisions in 2007. 
The following results are being presented: 
  
* The use of the RIMS code will capture, catalogue, and retrieve 
information with increased accuracy and effectiveness while decreasing 
the probability of uncertainty. 
 
* The use of the RIMS code is cost effective and will have minimal impact 
on the FBI’s current Information Technology structure and  not radically 
effect the FBI’s future Information Technology structure, SENTINEL. 
 
* The use of the RIMS code can be adapted for use by the whole USIC for 
commonality and uniformity in retrieval, cataloguing, and collecting of 
intelligence information. 
 
* The use of the RIMS code can be manipulated into a non-classified code 




A. FUTURE RESEARCH 
Vision of an Interoperable Terrorism Information Sharing 
Environment 
The vision of the interoperable terrorism information sharing environment, 
created and maintained in full partnership by all levels of Government, 
effectively supports detection, prevention, disruption, preemption, and 
mitigation of the effects of terrorism against the territory, people, and 
interests of the United States of America. 
It does so by enabling the interchange of terrorism information among and 
between appropriate Federal, State, Local, tribal, and territorial authorities, 
foreign partners and the private sector. It will support the ability of 
agencies to acquire additional such information, and, it will protect or 
enhance the freedom, information privacy, and other legal rights of 
Americans in the conduct of their activities. Initial Plan for the 
Interoperable Terrorism Information Sharing Environment, prepared by 
the Information 
— Initial Plan for the Interoperable Terrorism Information Sharing Environment, 
prepared by the Information Systems Council in response to EO-13356,  
20 December 2004. 
 
1. Enterprise Architecture 
Enterprise architecture is the practice of applying a comprehensive and rigorous 
method for describing a current and/or future structure and behavior for an organization's 
processes, information systems, personnel and organizational sub-units.  They must align 
with the organization's core goals and strategic direction. Enterprise architecture is 
becoming a common practice within the U.S. federal government to inform the Capital 
Planning and Investment Control (CPIC) process. The primary purpose of creating an 
enterprise architecture is to ensure that business strategy and IT investments are aligned. 
As such, enterprise architecture allows traceability from the business strategy down to the 
underlying technology.  The FBI and other U.S. intelligence and law enforcement 
agencies have differing IT Enterprise Architecture.  Connectivity by and between all 
members is needed to ensure that the current and future core goals and strategic direction 
of the U.S. intelligence and law enforcement agencies and the U.S. government are met.   
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The RIMS system is an effective and efficient information metadata tagging 
system within the FBI.  It has not been used or tested outside the FBI or with differing 
enterprise architecture structures.  Further validation of the RIMS system outside the FBI 
may allow a regional or nationwide national security system for information sharing.  
One way to initially integrate RIMS between various communities may be with 
Law Enforcement On-Line (LEO)63 since most agencies involved with national security 
issues have access to LEO at http://www.leo.gov and by clicking on the Homeland 
Security Information Network (HSIN)/ Joint Regional Exchange System (JRIES) portals.  
Further research, liaison, and tighter regulations concerning access and security within 
LEO must be facilitated and accepted by all entities that work to ensure the safety and 
security of America and its citizens.   
The FBI may be able to showcase RIMS within the Regional Data Exchange (R-
DEx), which provides a web-based platform for the law enforcement community to 
exchange information.  R-DEx enables the FBI to join participating federal, state, tribal, 
and local law enforcement agencies in regional, full-text information-sharing systems to 
under standard technical procedures and policy agreements.  Initial RIMS training and 
education — highlighting its collaborative abilities — would be essential to active 
participation by R-DEx members.  Further research, liaison, and tighter regulations 
concerning access and security within R-DEx must be facilitated and accepted by all 
entities.   
The FBI could also develop RIMS to facilitate information sharing within the 
National Data Exchange (N-DEx)64, which would provide a nationwide capability to 
                                                 
63 LEO has over 50,000 users with secure communications and has implemented the FBI National 
Alert System with the ability to reach over 20,000 members in five minutes; over 240 Special Interest 
Groups, including host services for the FBI Bomb Data Center Database, the National Center for Missing 
and Exploited Children, and the Department of Justice Joint Automated Booking System; and 24/7 
operational support, including a Virtual Command Center for special events.  
64 Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS) is developing the N-DEx, which will provide for the 
integration and discovery of criminal justice information on a national level, serve as an electronic catalog 
of structured criminal justice information that provides a “single point of discovery,”  leverage technology 
to relate massive amounts of data that is useful information, automate discovery of patterns and linkages to 
detect and deter crime and terrorism, and afford enhanced nationwide law enforcement communication and 
collaboration. 
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exchange data derived from incident and event reports from other nationwide agencies.  
Like R-DEx, N-DEx will require initial training and education to members and liaison, 
and tighter regulations concerning access and security within N-DEx must be facilitated 
and accepted by all entities who work to ensure the safety and security of America and its 
citizens. 
2. Extensible Markup Language (XML) 
A goal of homeland security is the development of a nationwide capability to 
exchange data between all levels of government. The ultimate development of RIMS 
would involve the development of common intelligence schemas and the use of SOA 
(System Oriented Architecture) including the use of Extensible Markup Language 
(XML).   XML is a markup language for documents containing structured information. 
XML makes it easy for a computer to exchange and read data, and ensure that the data 
structure is unambiguous. If used properly, XML tags can identify, validate and describe 
data. The proper use of XML will allow data to be more thoroughly described, in a richly 
structured document and separates data from format and computer platform. Both 
government and business have both adopted XML as the preferred format for information 
sharing. XML can make information sharing across many platforms and between 
agencies possible once XML security architectures are in place within the U.S. 
government.  
OASIS (Organization for the Advancement of Structured Information Standards), 
a consortium that drives the development, convergence, and adoption of web standards, 
could provide the collaborative platform among the intelligence communities to develop 
common schemas and metadata standardization, including enhancement,s and possibly 
the expansion of RIMS that will meet the needs of all intelligence communities. 
 69
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Berkowitz, Bruce D and Allen E. Goodman. Strategic Intelligence for American National 
Security. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1989. 
 
Betts, Richard K. “Analysis, War, and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures are 
Inevitable.” World Politics 31 (1978): 61-89. 
 
———. “Surprise Despite Warning: Why Sudden Attacks Succeed.” Political Science 
Quarterly 95 (1980-81): 551-572. 
 
Chan, Steve. “The Intelligence of Stupidity: Understanding Failures in Strategic 
Warning.” American Political Science Review 73 (1979): 171-180. 
 
Federal Bureau of Investigation. FBI Strategic Plan for Fiscal Year 2004-2009. 
Washington D. C: U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
2004.  http://www.fbi.gov/publications/strategicplan/stategicplantext.htm 
[Accessed April 2006]. 
 
———. SENTINEL – System Requirements Specification (SRS). Washington, D.C: U.S. 
Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, July 2005. 
 
Frum, David and Richard Perle. An End to Evil – How To Win The War On Terror. New 
York, N.Y: Ballantine Books, The Random House Publishing Group, 2003. 
 
Kent, Sherman. Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy. Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1951. 
 
Kind, Peter A. and J. Katharine Burton, Information Sharing and Collaboration Business 
Plan. Alexandria, Virginia: Institute for Defense Analysis, June 2005. 
 
Kim, W Chan and Renee Mauborgne. Blue Ocean Strategy. Boston, MA: Harvard 
Business School Press, 2005. 
Levite, Ariel. Intelligence and Strategic Surprises. New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1987. 
Lowenthal, Mark M. Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, 2nd ed. Washington, D.C:  
CQ Press, 2003. 
 
National Academy of Public Administration. Transforming the FBI: Roadmap to an 
Effective Human Capital Program. Washington, D.C: National Academy of 
Public Administration, September 2005.  
 
 70
9/11 Commission. The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National 
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. New York: W.W. 
Norton & Co, 2004. 
 
Office of the Director of National Intelligence. The National Intelligence Strategy of the 
United States – Transformation through Integration and Innovation. Washington, 
D.C.: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, October 2005. 
http://www.odni.gov [Accessed May 16, 2006]. 
 
Office of the Inspector General, The Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Pre-acquisition 
Planning For and Controls Over the Sentinel Case Management System, Audit 
Report Number 06-14, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of 
the Inspector General, March 2006. 
 
———. The Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Management of the Trilogy Information 
Technology Modernization Project, Audit Report 05-07. Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, February 2005. 
 
———. The Internal Effects of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Reprioritization. 
Audit Report 04-39. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the 
Inspector General, September 2004. 
 
———. A Review of the FBI’s Handling of Intelligence Information Related to the 
September 11 Attacks. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of 
the Inspector General, November 2004 (Released publicly June 2005). 
 
108th U.S. Congress, 2d Session. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 
2004 Conference Report. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Senate and House of 
Representatives, December 7, 2004. 
 
Treverton, Gregory F. Reshaping National Intelligence for an Age of Information. New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2001. 
 
U.S. Government Accountability Office. FBI Reorganization:  Initial Steps Encouraging 
but Broad Transformation Needed, GAO-02-865T. Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Government Accountability Office, June 2002. 
 
———. FBI Reorganization:  Progress Made in Efforts to Transform, but Major 
Challenges Remain, GAO-03-759T. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government 
Accountability Office, June 2003. 
 
———. FBI Reorganization:  Information Technology:  FBI Needs An Enterprise 
Architecture To Guide Its Modernization Activities, GAO-03-959. Washington, 
D.C: U.S. Government Accountability Office, September 2003. 
 71
———. FBI Transformation:  FBI Continues to Make Progress in Its Efforts to 
Transform and Address Priorities, GAO-04-578T. Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Government Accountability Office, March 2004. 
 
———.  9/11 Commission Report, Reorganization, Transformation and Information 
Sharing, GAO-04-1033T, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Accountability 
Office, August 3, 2004. 
 
———. Information Technology:  Foundation Steps Being Taken to Make Needed FBI 
Systems Modernization Management Improvements, GAO-04-842. Washington, 
D.C.: U.S. Government Accountability Office, September 2004. 
 
U.S. Government Printing Office. Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the U.S. 
Intelligence Community (Aspin-Brown Commission). Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1995-1996. 
 
White House. Further Strengthening Federal Bureau of Investigation Capabilities, 
Memorandum from the President to the Attorney General. Washington, D.C.: The 
White House, November 23, 2004. 
 
———. National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (NSCbT), February 2003. 
Washington, DC.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003. 
 
———. National Security Strategy of the United States. Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, September 2002.  
 
———. Strengthening the Ability of the Department of Justice to Meet Challenges to the 
Security of the Nation, Memorandum from the President to selected members of 
the Cabinet, the Director of National Intelligence, the Assistant to the President 
for National Security Affairs, and the Assistant to the President for Homeland 
Security and Counterterrorism.  Washington, D.C.: The White House, June 29, 
2005. 
 72
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 73
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia  
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California  
